Fordham Law Review
Volume 68

Issue 2

Article 5

1999

The Federal Boat Safety Act of 1971 and Propeller Strike Injuries:
An Unexpected Exercise in Federal Preemption
Amy P. Chiang

Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Amy P. Chiang, The Federal Boat Safety Act of 1971 and Propeller Strike Injuries: An Unexpected Exercise
in Federal Preemption, 68 Fordham L. Rev. 487 (1999).
Available at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr/vol68/iss2/5

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and
History. It has been accepted for inclusion in Fordham Law Review by an authorized editor of FLASH: The Fordham
Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more information, please contact tmelnick@law.fordham.edu.

The Federal Boat Safety Act of 1971 and Propeller Strike Injuries: An Unexpected
Exercise in Federal Preemption
Cover Page Footnote
I dedicate this Note to my family, Frank, Lisa, and David, and Mercer Borden. I thank them for their
patience, understanding, and support throughout this process. In addition, I thank Professor Joseph
Sweeney for helping me develop this topic and Note at its early stages.

This article is available in Fordham Law Review: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr/vol68/iss2/5

NOTES
THE FEDERAL BOAT SAFETY ACT OF 1971 AND
PROPELLER STRIKE INJURIES: AN UNEXPECTED
EXERCISE IN FEDERAL PREEMPTION

Amy P. Chiang"
INTRODUCTION

June 6, 1993 was a beautiful day to spend on the water. Kathryn
Lewis was doing just that-boating with her boyfriend and his family
on Strom Thurmond Lake in Georgia.' The boat was outfitted with a
Brunswick outboard motor 2 Although the motor did not have a
propeller guard, 3 no one gave it second thought. Everyone took turns
riding on an inner tube that was pulled behind the boat. During
Kathryn's boyfriend's turn to ride on the inner tube, the driver made a
sudden sharp turn.' In an instant, Kathryn fell or was tossed off the
left side of the boat
She tumbled into the water and onto the
motor's propeller blades. 6 The blades repeatedly struck Kathryn's
head and body as her boyfriend's family watched in horror2 She died
immediately.
* I dedicate this Note to my family, Frank, Lisa, and David, and Mercer
Borden. I thank them for their patience, understanding, and support throughout this
process. In addition, I thank Professor Joseph Sweeney for helping me develop this
topic and Note at its early stages.
1. See Lewis v. Brunswick Corp., 107 F.3d 1494, 1497 (11th Cir.), cert. granted,
118 S. Ct. 439 (1997), cert. dismissed, 118 S. Ct. 1793 (1998). This fact pattern is
loosely based on the Lewis case; details have been added.
2. See id. at 1497. An outboard motor is "a small internal combustion engine
with [the] propeller integrally attached for mounting at the stem of a small boat."
Merriam Webster's Collegiate Dictionary 825 (10th ed. 1997).
3. See Lewis, 107 F.3d at 1497. A propeller guard is a device that covers the
blades of a propeller motor to prevent contact between the blades and other objects,
including people. See also infra note 80 (describing types of guards that are available
on the market today). Its purpose in this context is to protect people from propeller
strike injuries caused by coming into contact with the blades.
4. See id
5. See id
6. See id
7. See id.
8. See id
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Unfortunately, tragic stories like Kathryn's are not uncommon.9
Both the number of recreational boaters and reported deaths and
accidents relating to recreational boating are rising steadily in the
United States.10 In 1997, the United States Coast Guard ("Coast
Guard") reported 8047 accidents and 4555 injuries related to
recreational boating."a These figures represented a record number of
accidents and injuries reported,12 and resulted in over $29 million in
property damage. 3 Similarly, the number of victims of motor or
propeller accidents is also increasing. 14 In 1997, the Coast Guard
reported 123 motor or propeller related accidents and 126 injuries, 15
up from 119 motor or propeller related accidents and 114 injuries
reported in 1996.16

This growing accident rate has resulted in several lawsuits
challenging the safety of outboard motors that are not equipped with
propeller guards.17 An unexpected outcome of these civil suits against
motor manufacturers is a heated debate over federal preemption of
these state law based claims.18 In the archetypal case, the exposed

propeller of an outboard motor injures or kills the plaintiff in a tragic
boating accident.1 9 The plaintiff, or the plaintiff's estate or survivors,
9. See, e.g., Carstensen v. Brunswick Corp., 49 F.3d 430, 431 (8th Cir. 1995)
(stating that the passenger fell off the boat and was injured by the boat's propeller);
Moss v. Outboard Marine Corp., 915 F. Supp. 183, 185 (E.D. Cal. 1996) (same);
Shields v. Outboard Marine Corp., 776 F. Supp. 1579, 1580 (M.D. Ga. 1991) (same).
10. See Thomas A. Russell & Richard J. Nikas, Recent Developments in
RecreationalBoating Law, 9 U.S.F. Mar. L.J. 381, 382 (1997). Russell and Nikas state:
Deaths involving personal watercraft and small open boats accounted for the
majority of recreational boating accidents and deaths in 1994. In sharp
contrast, only 68 individuals died in accidents involving the transportation of
cargo or passengers, or in commercial fishing accidents in 1995. The
disparity in casualties between recreational and commercial maritime
accidents underscores the hazards associated with the navigation and
operation of small vessels ....
Id. at 382-83 (footnotes omitted).
11. See U.S. Coast Guard, U.S. Dep't of Transp., Boating Statistics-1997, 8
(1999), available on United States Coast Guard Boating Statistics (visited Aug. 19,
1999) <http://www.uscgboating.org/stats.html>. This represents an increase from the
8026 accidents and 4442 injuries reported in 1996. See id. In 1995, there were 8019
accidents and 4141 injuries. See id.
12- See id. at 6.
13. See id. at 26.
14. See id.
15. See id.
16. See id. In 1995, the Coast Guard reported 117 accidents and 109 injuries. See
id.
17. See National Boating Safety Advisory Council, Report of the Propeller Guard
Subcomm. 4 (Nov. 7, 1989) [hereinafter PropellerGuard Report]; infra note 25.
18. See E. Gregg Barrios, Recent Developments in Admiralty and Maritime Law,
33 Tort & Ins. L.J. 277, 284 (1998); Alan J. Lazarus et. al., Recent Developments in
Products, General Liability, and Consumer Law, 31 Tort & Ins. L.J. 383, 393 (1996);
Dennis W. Nixon, Products Liability and Pleasure Boats, 29 J. Mar. L. & Com. 243,
251-54 (1998).
19. See supra notes 1-8 and accompanying text.
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sues the motor manufacturer based on a state common law tort claim
for failure to outfit the outboard motor with a propeller guard,'0
generally basing these suits on theories of negligence and product
liability.21 Inevitably, the defendant-companies move for summary
judgment on the ground that the Federal Boat Safety Act of 1971 22
("FBSA") preempts state common law claims regarding propeller
guardsPz3 The defendant typically argues that the plaintiff's claim is
preempted by the FBSA's requirement that state and federal boating
safety laws be identical in light of the Coast Guard's policy decision
not to mandate propeller guards.2 4
Twelve courts have addressed whether federal preemption is a valid

defense to these plaintiffs' common law claims

5

All but two courts

upheld the defense and ruled that the plaintiff's claims were

preempted. 6 Those courts finding preemption ("majority") have
done so on the ground that Congress's intent to preempt state law via
the FBSA, coupled with the Coast Guard's recommendation not to
regulate propeller guards, is tantamount to preempting the states from
regulating otherwise. 7

Courts that did not find preemption

("minority") generally focused on a narrower reading of the statute in
conjunction with a strong presumption against preemption and in
20. See Lewis v. Brunswick Corp., 107 F.3d 1494, 1497 (11th Cir.), cert. granted,
118 S. Ct. 439 (1997), cert dismissed, 118 S. Ct. 1793 (1998). After the accident,
Kathryn's parents filed suit in Georgia State court against the motor manufacturer,
Brunswick Corporation ("Brunswick"), to recover damages for their daughter's
death. See id. Kathryn's parents alleged that Brunswick's engine was defectively
designed for lack of a propeller guard and that Brunswick's failure to install a guard
constituted negligence. See hi
21. See Propeller Guard Report, supra note 17, at 4-5 (negligence); Elliot v.
Brunswick Corp., 903 F.2d 1505,1505 (11th Cir. 1990) (product liability).
22. See 46 U.S.C. §§ 4301-4311 (1994).
23. See Lewis, 107 F.3d at 1497; Davis v. Brunswick Corp., 854 F. Supp. 1574, 1578
(N.D. Ga. 1993), on reconsiderationin part (Mar. 17,1994).
24. See Moore v. Brunswick Bowling & Billiards Corp., 889 S.W.2d 246,248 (Tex.
1994) ("[Defendant] contends that [Plaintiff's] claims are expressly preempted by the
combination of § 4306 and the Coast Guard's decision not to mandate propeller
guards through regulation, as evidenced by a Coast Guard report." (footnote
omitted)).
25. Thirteen cases have arisen over this issue in twelve courts. See Lewis, 107 F.3d
at 1494; Carstensen v. Brunswick Corp., 49 F.3d 430 (8th Cir. 1995); Elliot, 903 F2d at
1505; Moss v. Outboard Marine Corp., 915 F. Supp. 183 (E.D. Cal. 1996); Shield v.
Bayliner Marine Corp., 822 F. Supp. 81 (D. Conn. 1993); Davis, 854 F. Supp. at 1574;
Shields v. Outboard Marine Corp., 776 F. Supp. 1579 (M.D. Ga. 1991); Mowery v.
Mercury Marine, Div. of Brunswick Corp., 773 F. Supp. 1012 (N.D. Ohio 1991);
Beech v. Outboard Marine Corp., 584 So. 2d 447 (Ala. 1991); Farner v. Brunswick
Corp., 607 N.E.2d 562 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992); Ryan v. Brunswick Corp., 531 N.V.2d 793
(Mich. Ct. App. 1995); Ard v. Jensen, 996 S.W.2d 594 (Mo. Ct. App. 1999); Moore,
889 S.W.2d at 246. Two of these cases did not apply a preemption analysis and
therefore are not included in this discussion. See Elliot, 903 F.2d at 1508 n.3; Beech,
584 So. 2d at 450.
26. See infra part III.
27. See infra part III.A.
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favor of states' rights.21 In recognition of this controversy, the
Supreme Court granted certiorari to Lewis v. Brunswick Corp. in
1997.29 This highly anticipated decision never came to fruition,
however, as the parties agreed to dismiss the case before the Court
rendered judgment.30 Thus, the issue of the FBSA's preemption of
state common law claims remains unresolved. 1
This Note considers whether the FBSA preempts state common law
tort claims for liability based on a failure to install propeller guards. It
concludes that although the FBSA does not expressly preempt such
claims, it does so implicitly. Part I discusses the historical backdrop
and legislative history of the Federal Boat Safety Act of 1971. This
part also examines the report on the feasibility and effectiveness of
requiring propeller guards and the Coast Guard's subsequent decision
not to mandate propeller guards. Part II outlines the doctrine of
federal preemption and its basic principles and characteristics. Part
III sets forth the division among the courts over whether the FBSA
preempts state common law propeller guard claims. Part IV applies
preemption analysis and finds that while defendant-companies do not
have an express preemption defense to these state tort claims, they do
have an implied preemption defense. This Note concludes that courts
should henceforth rule that the FBSA implicitly preempts any state
common law tort claim for liability based on the absence of an
outboard motor propeller guard.
I. BACKGROUND

This part discusses the FBSA and the circumstances and intent
behind its enactment, as well as the study assessing the feasibility of
requiring propeller guards on the outboard motors of recreational
boats.
A. The FederalBoat Safety Act of 1971: HistoricalBackdrop &
LegislativeHistory
The Federal Boat Safety Act of 197132 authorizes the Coast Guard
to promulgate "regulations establishing minimum safety standards for
recreational vessels and associated equipment ....33 The FBSA's

original purpose was to create a uniform national boating safety
program to promote the overall participation and enjoyment of
recreational boating, and to simultaneously shield from injury the
28. See infra part III.B.
29. 118 S. Ct. 439,439 (1997).
30. See Lewis, 118 S. Ct. at 1793.

31. This may not be the case for long, however, as a more recent decision in 1999
may soon raise this issue with the Court again. See Ard v. Jensen, 996 S.W.2d 594
(Mo. Ct. App. 1999).
32. The Federal Boat Safety Act is codified at 46 U.S.C. §§ 4301-4311 (1994).
33. Id. § 4302(a)(1); see infra note 70.
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growing number of people attracted to recreational boating.'
When the FBSA was initially proposed, recreational boating was
increasing at an astronomical rate.35 Unfortunately, this growth came
at a price.34 Nearly 7000 persons lost their lives in boating accidents
between 1966-1970.37 Sources predicted that the number of boat
owners would rise rapidly,38 and that the number of boat related
fatalities would increase. Existing law seemed inadequate to handle
this explosion of casualties.39 In Congress's view, the annual fatality
rate was alarming enough to warrant requiring recreational boating
manufacturers to adhere to higher safety standards-on par with the
dangers associated with use of their products.'4
According to
Congress, new and uniform federal regulation "could substantially
reduce the level of fatalities ... resulting
from boating mishaps." 41
42
FBSA.
Thus, Congress enacted the
34. See H.R. Rep. No. 94-1578, at 2 (1976), reprintedin 1976 U.S.C.CA.N. 5542,
5542.
35. See S. Rep. No. 92-248, at 6-7 (1971), reprinted in 1971 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1333,
1333-34 (estimating that "the number of recreational boats in the United States [was]
increasing at the rate of about 4,000 per week and that by 1975 over 50 million
persons [would] be engaged in [boating]," and that "[olver 40 million Americans
[were] engag[ed] in recreational boating each year in approximately 9,000,000
boats").
36. See id., reprinted in 1971 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1333, 1333-34 (stating that this
"development has also brought with it accidents, deaths and injuries").
37. See id. at 7, reprintedin 1971 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1333,1334.
38. See iL at 6, reprinted in 1971 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1333, 1333-34; H.R. Rep. No. 92324, at 2 (1971).
39. See S. Rep. No. 92-248, at 14 (1971), reprintedin 1971 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1333, 1335
(stating that "[a]wareness of the need for new legislation in boating safety has been
growing for several years"). Prior law consisted of the Motorboat Act of 1940, Pub.
L. No. 76-484, 54 Stat. 163 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 46 U.S.C.),
and the Federal Boating Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-911, 72 Stat. 1754 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 46 U.S.C.). The 1940 Act required specific safety
equipment and measures. See S. Rep. No. 92-248, at 13 (1971), reprinted in 1971
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1333, 1335. The 1940 Act was problematic for two reasons. First, its
requirements were inflexible and could not be modified to accommodate situations
not contemplated by the statute. See id. at 13-14, reprintedin 1971 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1333,
1335. Second, compliance with the 1940 Act depended solely on the boat owner or
operator, even if the ability to comply was beyond the operator's control and lay with
the manufacturer. See id. at 14, reprintedin 1971 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1333, 1335. The 1958
Act merely provided for "the current scheme for State numbering of small boats
under Federal supervision." Id., reprintedin 1971 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1333, 1335. The need
for new legislation was clear. See id., reprintedin 1971 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1333, 1335. The
FBSA's enactment was intended to supply this need.
40. See id. at 13, reprintedin 1971 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1333,1335; see also H.R. Rep. No.
92-324, at 2 (1971) (stating that the number of deaths related to recreational boating
was "distressing, either in absolute terms or relative to other modes of
transportation").
41. S. Rep. No. 92-248, at 13 (1971), reprintedin 1971 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1333,1334.
42. See id. at 6, reprinted in 1971 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1333, 1333 (stating that the FBSA
"largely incorporates the substance of the Federal Boating Act of 1958, which would
be repealed, and thereby essentially provides a single comprehensive Act dealing with
the subject of safety for boats used principally for other than commercial use"); H.R.
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Congress believed that requiring manufacturers to provide safer
boats and equipment could improve boating safety. 3 New and
uniform manufacturing and equipment standards at the federal level
would also limit any interference with interstate commerce."
Additionally, Congress wanted to increase the role of the states in
boating safety by providing a federal grant in aid incentive payment
program to states that had instituted, or intended to institute, certain
approved state boating safety programs.45 State involvement in
boating safety was necessary because approximately half of all deaths
and more than one-third of all accidents occurred in waters solely
under state jurisdiction.4 6
As enacted, the FBSA was a broad statute that sought to regulate
recreational boating.47 Rather than set forth specific standards, the
FBSA authorized the Coast Guard to consider and prescribe
standards and regulations for recreational vessels.4"
The FBSA
focused primarily on establishing uniform safety standards for the
manufacture and performance of recreational boating vessels and
their related equipment.4 9
B. Preemptionand Preservationof Common Law Claims
Particularly relevant to these common law claims involving
propeller strike injuries are two FBSA provisions: the federal
preemption clause ("preemption clause") and the saving to suitors
clause ("savings clause").50
Rep. 92-324, at 2-3 (1971) ("It is time that recreational boats be built in accordance
with standards prescribed by one Federal agency-in this case the Coast Guard-so
that the public can enjoy recreational boating with greater safety.").
43. See S. Rep. No. 92-248, at 6 (1971), reprintedin 1971 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1333, 1333.
44. See id. at 14, reprinted in 1971 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1333, 1335. A uniform standard
facilitates interstate commerce because it is easier for a product to comply with one
safety standard than with 50 different standards.
45. See id., reprintedin 1971 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1333, 1335.
46. See id. at 13, reprinted in 1971 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1333, 1334.
47. See H.R. Rep. No. 98-338, at 158 (1983), reprinted in 1983 U.S.C.C.A.N. 924,
970. The FBSA involves the creation of "national construction and performance
standards for recreational vessels and their associated equipment, the necessary
flexible regulatory authority for inspection and testing, Federal preemption, certain
necessary prohibited acts, enforcement authority, investigation and reporting
requirements, procedures for repair and defect notification, and attendant penalties
and injunctive relief." Id., reprintedin 1983 U.S.C.C.A.N. 924, 970.
48. See id. at 159, reprinted in 1983 U.S.C.C.A.N. 924, 971. The FBSA actually
granted this right to the Secretary of Transportation, who delegated this responsibility
to the Coast Guard. See Lewis v. Brunswick Corp., 107 F.3d 1494, 1498 (11th Cir.),
cert. granted, 118 S. Ct. 439 (1997), cert. dismissed, 118 S. Ct. 1793 (1998); see also 46
U.S.C. § 4303 (1994) (authorizing the Secretary to delegate its duties under the FBSA
to "a person, private or public agency, or organization").
49. See H.R. Rep. No. 98-338, at 158 (1983), reprintedin 1983 U.S.C.C.A.N. 924,
970.
50. See Becker v. United States Marine Co., 943 P.2d 700, 702-03 (Wash. Ct. App.
1997).
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The preemption clause provides that "a State or political
subdivision of a State may not establish, continue in effect, or enforce
a law or regulation establishing" safety standards or imposing
requirements for recreational vessels or associated equipment "that is
not identical to a regulation prescribed under [the FBSA]." 51 The
preemption clause essentially requires state laws or regulations to
match the federal regulations prescribed under the FBSAP and
allows for the federal preemption of state standards for boat and
equipment safety. 3 The clause comports Nvith the established
tradition of preemption in maritime safety by addressing the need for
uniform regulations for recreational boats operating in interstate
commerce.M5 The clause also ensures that the FBSA would not
require manufacturers of such boats and equipment to abide by
widely varying local laws.s5
The preemption clause, however, cannot preempt state laws or
regulations regarding safe boat operation and use that are properly
within the scope of state or local concern.s Congress realized that
certain locations may have unusual situations that warrant a departure
from the uniform federal standardYl As such, the preemption clause

allows states to impose additional requirements for "carrying or using
marine safety articles... when necessary to meet uniquely hazardous
local conditions or circumstances." ' This right is limited, however,
and is still ultimately subject to the need for uniformity. 59
51. 46 U.S.C. § 4306. The preemption clause provides in full:
Federal preemption
Unless permitted by the Secretary under section 4305 of this title, a State or
political subdivision of a State may not establish, continue in effect, or
enforce a law or regulation establishing a recreational vessel or associated
equipment performance or other safety standard or imposing a requirement
for associated equipment (except insofar as the State or political subdivision
may, in the absence of the Secretary's disapproval, regulate the carrying or
use of marine safety articles to meet uniquely hazardous conditions or
circumstances within the State) that is not identical to a regulation
prescribed under section 4302 of this title.
IdL
52. See, e.g., Ryan v. Brunswick Corp., 531 N.W.2d 793,795 (Mich. Ct. App. 1995)
("Section 4302 authorizes the Secretary of Transportation to prescribe regulations
requiring the installation of certain equipment on recreational vessels and prohibiting
the installation of equipment that does not conform with federal safety standards.").
53. See S. Rep. No. 92-248, at 20 (1971), reprinted in 1971 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1333,
1341.
54. See id., reprintedin 1971 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1333, 1341.
55. See id., reprintedin 1971 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1333,1341.
56. See id., reprintedin 1971 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1333,1341; infra note 311.
57. See S. Rep. No. 92-248, at 20 (1971), reprinted in 1971 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1333,
1341; see also infra note 311 (discussing one locale where this provision might be
applicable).
58. S.Rep. No. 92-248, at 20 (1971), reprintedin 1971 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1333,1341.
59. See id., reprinted in 1971 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1333, 1341 ("A right of disapproval,
however, is reserved to the Secretary to insure that indiscriminate use of state
authority does not seriously impinge on the basic need for uniformity.").
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The FBSA also contains a savings clause that preserves particular
common law claims from federal preemption. 6° The inclusion of the
savings clause indicates that Congress anticipated and acquiesced to
common law claims implicating the FBSA. 1 The clause provides that
compliance with the FBSA does not preclude liability at common
law,62 and preserves those claims that are compatible with the FBSA's
federal regulatory scheme. 63 Congress intended to ensure that
defendant manufacturers could not use mere compliance with the
minimum standards established under the FBSA as a defense in
product liability suits. 64 Thus, Congress had no intention of
completely shielding the boating industry from state tort liability. 65
The preemption clause and the savings clause pull in opposite
directions, creating a tension in statutory interpretation. 66 On the one
hand, the preemption clause grants the federal government the power
to override state law when regulating under the FBSA.67 On the other
hand, the savings clause suggests that this power is not absolute, and
that the states retain some ability to regulate boating safety. 68
Therefore, the challenge lies in interpreting the two clauses in a way
that gives effect to both.69

C. The Report of the PropellerGuardSubcommittee
Under the FBSA, the Secretary of Transportation ("Secretary") has
the power to promulgate the statute's safety standards and
regulations.7" Before prescribing a regulation, the Secretary must first
consult with the National Boating Safety Advisory Council
("NBSAC") regarding the necessity of the regulation and the extent
to which regulation will increase recreational boating safety. 7' If the
60. The savings clause is codified at 46 U.S.C. § 4311(g) (1994) and provides in
full: "Compliance with this chapter or standards, regulations, or orders prescribed

under this chapter does not relieve a person from liability at common law or under
State law."
61. See Lewis v. Brunswick Corp., 107 F.3d 1494, 1504 (11th Cir.), cert. granted,
118 S. Ct. 439 (1997), cert. dismissed, 118 S. Ct. 1793 (1998).
62. See 46 U.S.C. § 4311(g).
63. See Lewis, 107 F.3d at 1504 (deciding which product liability claims may be
brought "without upsetting the overall scheme Congress intended").
64. See S. Rep. No. 92-248, at 32 (1971), reprinted in 1971 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1333,
1352.
65. See Becker v. United State Marine Co., 943 P.2d 700, 703 (Wash. Ct. App.

1997).
66. See id.
67. See supra text accompanying notes 51-59.
68. See supra text accompanying notes 60-65.

69. See Becker, 943 P.2d at 703.
70. See 46 U.S.C. § 4302 (1994). The Secretary then delegated his powers and
duties under the FBSA to the Secretary of the Coast Guard pursuant to 46 U.S.C. §
4303(a). See Moore v. Brunswick Bowling & Billiards Corp., 889 S.W.2d 246, 248 n.3
(Tex. 1994); supra note 48.
71. See Moore, 889 S.W.2d at 248 (citing 46 U.S.C. § 4302(c)(4)).
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regulation will compel substantial future alteration of a vessel or piece
of associated equipment, the Secretary and the NBSAC must initially
determine that such regulation is necessary to avert a significant risk
of physical harm to the public.l
Pursuant to these provisions, the Secretary of the Coast Guard-to
whom the Secretary's power was delegated-instructed the NBSAC to
appoint a Propeller Guard Subcommittee ("Subcommittee") in 1988 to
review and assess data concerning propeller accidents. The NBSAC
charged the Subcommittee with examining the possibility of mandating
The
propeller guards to avoid propeller related injuries!'
of
Report
the
in
forth
set
are
conclusions
and
Subcommittee's results
7 5 The report concluded: (1)
Subcommittee.
the Propeller Guard
propeller guards can only slightly increase boating safety, especially
because propellers themselves are so rarely the "sole" cause of injury in
an underwater impact;76 (2) the drawbacks of using propeller guards
outweigh any protection they may provide in a propeller strike;" (3)
efforts to improve recreational boating safety should focus on boater
education, rather than superficial solutions such as a propeller guard
requirement, because the initial cause of these accidents is often
operator error;7 and (4) recreational boaters should not be lulled into a
false sense of security by "thinking there is a 'safe' device ' which would
eliminate or significantly reduce such injuries or fatalities."
The report documented many problems with the use of propeller
guards to prevent propeller strike accidents. For example, studies
showed that some current designs for propeller guards create new
hazards such as catching and trapping limbs against the rotating
72- See id. at 248 (citing 46 U.S.C. § 4302(c)(3)).
73. See PropellerGuardReport, supra note 17, at 1.
74. See id. app. A. Specifically, the NBSAC's charge was to consider. (a) available
propeller accident data and possible ways of covering propellers to prevent propeller
accidents; (b) arguments for and against using such methods to prevent propeller
strikes; and (c) several other factors such as how often such accidents occurred,
whether the number of such accidents was increasing or decreasing, and whether
there should be federal regulation. See id.
75. See id. at 20-24.
76. See id. at 23. Most injuries and fatalities from underwater accidents result
from an impact with any part of the propulsion unit, rather than with the propeller
blade. See id.
77. See id. (concluding that the use of propeller guards "can create new hazards of
equal or greater importance").
7& See id. Ignorant or careless operators are often a cause of boating accidents
and
because they fail to understand the "abilities and limitations of their equipment"
example,
For
Id.
boats.
their
of
operation"
negligent
or
careless
of
"the consequences
a boat operator can reduce the chance of an underwater propeller accident by
operating a boat in a manner that would prevent passengers from falling overboard.
See id.at 10-11.
79. Id. at 24. The report also concluded that there is no propeller safety device
currently available that can significantly reduce injuries, nor will one be available in
the foreseeable future. See id.
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propeller."0 The additional bulk of a propeller guard also adds an
impact hazard by increasing the surface area with which a submerged
victim can come into contact.81 Propeller guards also adversely affect
boat operation. The addition of a propeller guard poses serious
steering and handling problems, increases drag, 82 and dramatically
reduces power and fuel efficiency. 3 Although propeller guards have
been used successfully in some situations, they are still unfit for general
use. For example, amusement parks have used guards on bumper boats
for years." These boats, however, operate at a maximum speed of two
miles per hour where a guard would not affect a boat's performance.
Recreational boats, on other hand, generally travel at much higher
speeds where a guard is more likely to adversely effect a boat's
operation.86 Rescue boats have also had some success with mask type
guards. Although the wide-spaced bars on these guards minimize drag
when racing to the rescue scene, they do not prevent body appendages
from becoming trapped against the propeller."
Additionally, evidence that the incidence of propeller caused deaths
were relatively infrequent suggested that the installation of guards,
even if successful, would do little to improve overall boating safety.M
In fact, the number of people affected was minimal compared to the
overall number of boating accidents reported per year.89 One study
80. See id. at 20-21. The report considered the three types of guards then
available: the ring, screen, and tunnel/tube. See id. at 12-15 (describing each type of
guard in further detail). Each type of guard has its own particular drawback. See id.
For example:
In the case of the ring type guard, a new hazard is created, in that an arm,
leg, etc., may be caught by the bars or ring and held against the rotating
propeller. Operators of a "guard-equipped boat" can be expected to have a
false sense of security when approaching persons in the water at slow speeds,
with a very real risk of impacting and/or entrapping a body appendage.
Id. at 20-21 (internal quotations omitted).
81. See id. at 20-21. The added bulk of the propeller guard increases significantly
the "underwater profile" of a boat, thereby increasing the odds of underwater
contact. Id. at 20. Although propellers can cut and penetrate the body, guards
increase the "hazard of blunt trauma injuries, which are often more severe." Id. at 1819. For example, "a skull impact at 10 mph or more in the water would be generally
fatal." Id. at 17.
82. Drag is defined as either "motion effected with slowness or difficulty" or
"something that retards motion or action." Merriam Webster's Collegiate Dictionary
350 (10th ed. 1997).
83. See Propeller Guard Report, supra note 17, at 16-17. In one experiment, the
added drag caused by the propeller guard reduced boat speed from 37 mph to 27
mph, requiring a 100% increase in horsepower to regain the initial speed. See id. at 17.
84. See id. at 15.
85. See id.
86. Normal operating speed is 10 mph or more, and is generally between 13-35
mph. See id. at 19-21 (discussing the adverse effects of propeller guards at speeds
higher than 10 mph).
87. See id. at 15.
88. See id. at 23.
89. See id.
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found that the number of boating deaths involving propellers,
approximately thirty to forty-nine per year, equaled one-third to onehalf of the number of deaths associated with being struck by lightning.
Ultimately, the Subcommittee recommended that the "Coast Guard
take no regulatory action [requiring] propeller guards."9'
The
NBSAC approved the Subcommittee report, and the Coast Guard
adopted all of the Subcommittee's recommendationsY- The Coast
Guard's official position was that current propeller guard accident
data did not warrant mandating propeller guards on motorboats. 3
The Coast Guard also noted the prohibitive costs of retrofitting
millions of boats and the lack of a universal guard that could fit all
boats as other reasons in support of its conclusion." Finally, the Coast
Guard agreed to continue its efforts in monitoring propeller accident
data and improvements in the propeller guard industry.95
The FBSA, therefore, does not require recreational boaters to
install propeller guards. It will not do so until the benefits of such a
requirement demonstrably outweigh its drawbacks. Plaintiffs,
however, continue to bring state tort claims based on a failure to
install a propeller guard. In view of this conflict, the next part sets
forth the basic principles of federal preemption of state common law
claims, and discusses in detail the different types of preemption.
II. THE DoCrRiNE OF FEDERAL PREEMPTION
The defense commonly employed in claims based on propeller
strike injuries is that the FBSA, combined with the Coast Guard's
decision not to mandate propeller guards, precludes the plaintiff's
state law based claims. This part outlines the basic principles of the
doctrine of preemption and examines the two types of preemption,
expressed and implied.
A. Background and Basic Principles
The doctrine of preemption is rooted in the Supremacy Clause of

90. The study was conducted in 1981, and covered the period from 1976 to 1981.

See id app. E, at 1-2 (letter from Robert K. Taylor, P.E., Managing Engineer, Failure
Analysis Associates, to Captain James E. Getz, Chairman, Propeller Guard
Subcommittee, NBSAC (Aug. 2,1989)).

91. See id at 24.
92. See Moore v. Brunswick Bowling & Billiards Corp., 889 S.W.2d 246,249 (Tex.
1994) (citing Letter from Robert T. Nelson, Rear Admiral U.S. Coast Guard, Chief,
Office of Navigation and Waterway Servs., to Mr. A. Newell Garden, Chairman (Feb.

1,1990)).
93. See id
94. See id. There are an infinite number of types of boats and motors on the water
that differ in design, function, size, and type. See PropellerGuard Report, supra note
17, at 22. Thus, manufacturing a guard to fit all boats is nearly impossible. See id.
95. See Moore, 889 S.W.2d at 249.

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 68

the United States Constitution.96 The Supremacy Clause provides that
the laws of the United States "shall be the supreme Law of the
Land,"' and essentially grants Congress the power to preempt state
law.98 The power to preempt state law extends to both positive
enactments and common law.99 Despite this extensive grant of power,
courts seldom find that Congress exercises this power to its fullest

extent.1"

When addressing issues arising under the Supremacy

Clause, courts presume that federal law does not supersede state

police powers unless Congress clearly intended it to do so. 10 1 The
"ultimate touchstone" of preemption is therefore Congressional
intent. 1°2
When considering a claim of preemption, courts weigh three
103
principles: federalism, predictability, and ease of administration.
1
The first and most important principle is federalism, " which requires
balancing the federal government's interest in regulation against the
state government's desire to regulate its own interests and maintain its
96. See Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 516 (1992); Davis v.
Brunswick Corp., 854 F. Supp. 1574, 1579 (N.D. Ga. 1993), on reconsideration in part
(Mar. 17, 1994); Mowery v. Mercury Marine, Div. of Brunswick Corp., 773 F. Supp.
1012, 1013 (N.D. Ohio 1991); Moore, 889 S.W.2d at 247; Becker v. United States
Marine Co., 943 P.2d 700, 703 (Wash. Ct. App. 1997). But see Jack W. Campbell IV,
Regulatory Preemption in the Garcia/Chevron Era, 59 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 805, 813-14
(1998) (discussing courts' erroneous tendency to rely on the Supremacy Clause as the
root of the preemption doctrine); Stephen A. Gardbaum, The Nature of Preemption,
79 Cornell L. Rev. 767, 768 (1994) (positing that it is error to believe that Congress's
power to preempt is "closely and essentially connected to the Supremacy Clause").
97. U.S. Const. art. VI. The Supremacy Clause provides in full: "This
Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance
thereof.., shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall
be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary
notwithstanding." Id.
98. See Ryan v. Brunswick Corp., 531 N.W.2d 793,795 (Mich. Ct. App. 1995). For
example, under the Supremacy Clause, Congress can preempt state law when it
legislates pursuant to its power to regulate interstate commerce as derived from the
Commerce Clause. See Marc S. Klein, Toward a Workable Paradigm of Federal
Preemption, 1998 ALI-ABA Course of Study 101, 107.
99. See Shields v. Outboard Marine Corp., 776 F. Supp. 1579, 1581 (M.D. Ga.
1991) ("The preemption doctrine applies not only to state laws and regulations, but
common law rules and jury awards of damages as well, since they also act as
regulations and can frustrate congressional objectives.").
100. See Betsy J. Grey, Make Congress Speak Clearly: FederalPreemption of State
Tort Remedies, 77 B.U. L. Rev. 559, 567-68 (1997).
101. See id. at 568-69.
102. Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996) (quoting Retail Clerks v.
Schermerhorn, 315 U.S. 96, 103 (1963)); accord Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505
U.S. 504, 516 (1992); Lewis v. Brunswick Corp., 107 F.3d 1494, 1500 (11th Cir.), cert.
granted, 118 S. Ct. 439 (1997), cert. dismissed, 118 S.Ct. 1793 (1998); Farner v.
Brunswick Corp., 607 N.E.2d 562, 565 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992); Grey, supra note 100, at
568-69; Klein, supra note 98, at 106; Susan J. Stabile, Preemption of State Law by
FederalLaw: A Task for Congress or the Courts?, 40 Vill. L. Rev. 1, 7 (1995).
103. See Stabile, supra note 102, at 8-14.
104. See id. at 9.
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"spheref of power."10 5 Under the Tenth Amendment, those powers
not delegated to the federal government, also known as the police
powers, 106 are reserved to the States. 1"" The Tenth Amendment
thereby checks Congress's power to override state law.10u Courts must
balance the Tenth Amendment against the Supremacy Clause's grant
of federal power to uphold state sovereignty in accordance with
principles of federalism. 19
The second principle courts weigh is predictability" 0 Predictability
refers to the ease with which those subject to a law can interpret that
law."' Predictability allows those subject to a law to determine more
easily which law governs and to adjust their behavior accordingly. 12
Although ease of interpretation is always a concern, this is especially
important within the federal preemption context because preemption
inherently involves interpreting the substance of two laws-one
federal and one state-and the interaction between them."' A
predictable preemption analysis that determines which standard
governs simplifies the process for those subject to the conflicting
standards and improves compliance.11 4 A wholesale predictability

analysis is not advised, however, because it can lead to an inflexible
system of regulation that is less adaptable to the various situations
that inevitably arise." 5 Thus, courts try to strike a balance between
predictability and flexibility to reach the best result." 6
The third and final principle in preemption analysis is ease of
administration." 7 Ease of administration focuses on the judicial
105. Id-at 10.
106. The police powers of the states extend to areas "traditionally relegated to the
states... such as health and safety regulation, and in matters of only 'peripheral
concern' to federal law." Grey, supra note 100, at 569.
107. See U.S. Const. amend. X. The 10th Amendment provides in full: "The
powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to
the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people." Id.
108. See Grey, supra note 100, at 568 (noting that under the Tenth Amendment,
each state "will maintain a sovereign status independent of the national
government"); see also Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542, 547 n.7 (1975) ("The
[Tenth] Amendment expressly declares the constitutional policy that Congress may
not exercise power in a fashion that impairs the States' integrity or their ability to
function effectively in a federal system.").
109. See, eg., Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504,516 (1992) (noting the
delicate balance between the federal grant of power in the Supremacy clause and the
preservation of the States' "historic police powers"); Grey, supra note 100, at 568
(emphasizing the Court's concern for "Federal-State" balance when resolving
preemption issues) (citing Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525 (1977)).
110. See Stabile, supra note 102, at 9.
111. See id. at 11.
112- See id. at 11-12.
113. See id at 11.
at 11-13.
114. See id.
at 13.
115. See id116. See id. at 13-14.
117. See id. at 9.
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system and its ability to operate effectively and efficiently.118 This
principle relates to developing a sufficiently simple method of
preemption analysis that lower courts can easily follow." 9 Complex
rules for preemption analysis that are difficult to apply correctly and
consistently yield uncertain and varying results.1 20 This, in turn leads
to increased litigation, which is both expensive and time consuming."'
Thus, courts consider ease of administration when applying
preemption analysis to avoid this unnecessary drain on the judicial
system's resources. 12 Thus, preemption analysis begins with the
Supremacy Clause, and continues with the principles of federalism,
predictability, and efficiency. Together, they drive preemption
analysis and help to determine the most just and beneficial outcome.
B. Types of Preemption
There are two types of federal preemption: express preemption and
implied preemption.1 " Whether preemption is found to be express or
implied, the final result is the same-the relevant state law is rendered
inoperable.1 24
1. Express Preemption
Express preemption occurs when Congress drafts a statute that
includes language explicitly stating that the federal statute preempts
state law. 12 An express preemption inquiry focuses on whether the
118.
119.
120.
121.

See id. at 14.
See id.
See id.
See id.

122- See id.
123. See Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525 (1977); Davis v. Brunswick
Corp., 854 F. Supp. 1574, 1581 (N.D. Ga. 1993), on reconsiderationin part (Mar. 17,

1994). Some courts divide preemption into three categories, but substantively the law
is the same. See Lewis v. Brunswick Corp., 107 F.3d 1494, 1500 (11th Cir.), cert.

granted, 118 S. Ct. 439 (1997), cert. dismissed, 118 S. Ct. 1793 (1998); Mowery v.
Mercury Marine, Div. of Brunswick Corp., 773 F. Supp. 1012, 1013-14 (N.D. Ohio
1991). For example, in Lewis, the court stated:

Congressional intent to preempt state law may be revealed in several ways:
(1) 'express preemption,' in which Congress defines explicitly the extent to
which its enactments preempt state law; (2) 'field preemption,' in which state
law is preempted because Congress has regulated a field so pervasively, or

federal law touches on a field implicating such a dominant federal interest,

that an intent for federal law to occupy the field exclusively may be inferred;

and (3) 'conflict preemption,' in which state law is preempted by implication
because state and federal law actually conflict, so that it is impossible to
comply with both, or state law 'stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment
and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.'
Lewis, 107 F.3d at 1500 (citations omitted).
124. See supra part II.A.

125. See Klein, supra note 98, at 107 ("Congress (or an administrative agency to
which it has delegated the power) ... specifically declare[s], in a statute or regulation,
an intention to foreclose state law in a particular area."); Grey, supra note 100, at 566.
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language of the preemption provision demonstrates a congressional

intent to preempt state law.2 6 The most common indicator of express
preemption is the presence of a preemption clause in a federal
statute27 because such a clause clearly demonstrates a congressional
intent to preempt. 12s
A preemption clause also defines the scope and extent of the
federal statute's preemption.'29 Once a statute is found to contain an
express preemption clause, courts use statutory construction to
identify the scope of the preemption to determine the domain

preempted. 30 Courts do not interpret the preemption provision "in a
contextual vacuum," instead they also consider the presumption
against preemption and the congressional purpose behind the
statute." This analysis often implicates four factors: (1) the statute's
plain language, or what it says on its face;'3 (2) the presumption
against preemption; 33 (3) the congressional purpose in enacting the

126. Express preemption clauses are not uncommon in federal statutes. For
example, the Employee Retirement Income Security Act ("ERISA") features a
preemption clause, which provides that federal law "shall supersede any and all State
laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan." Klein,
supra note 98, at 107 n.11 (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1988)). The National Traffic
and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966 provided that "no State... shall have any
authority either to establish, or to continue in effect... any safety standard... not
identical to the Federal standard." 15 U.S.C. § 1392(d) (repealed 1994). The Medical
Devices Amendments provide that "no State or political subdivision of a State may
establish or continue in effect... any requirement-() which is different from, or in
addition to, any requirement applicable under this chapter to the device, and (2)
which relates to the safety or effectiveness of the device... under this chapter." 21
U.S.C. § 360k (1994).
127. Cf Stabile, supra note 102, at 7 ("In express preemption situations, such intent
is sought primarily in the language of the preemption provision.").
128. See Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 471 (1996) (stating that "the Court
need not go beyond [the statute's] pre-emptive language to determine whether
Congress intended the [statute] to pre-empt at least some state law"); Cipollone v.
Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 517 (1992) (finding "there is no need to infer
congressional intent to pre-empt state laws from the substantive provisions of the
legislation" where a statute contains an express preemption provision (internal
quotations omitted)).
129. See Cipollone,505 U.S. at 517.
130. See Medtronic,518 U.S. at 471 (applying statutory interpretation to determine
"the domain expressly pre-empted" (quoting Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 517) (internal
quotations omitted)); Grey, supra note 100, at 566, 568-69.
131. Medtronic, 518 U.S. at 485. Justice Scalia disagreed with the plurality's
application of the principles of interpretation in deciphering an express preemption
clause in Cipollone. See 505 U.S. at 544-45 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part). In Scalia's opinion, once express preemption has been established
by the presence of a preemption clause, the statute should be interpreted according to
the ordinary or apparent meaning on its face, without applying additional principles
or considerations. See id
132. See Medtronic, 518 U.S. at 486-89; Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 517-18; Grey, supra
note 100, at 566.
133. See Medtronic, 518 U.S. at 485, 487 (declaring that this presumption not only
applied to the existence of a preemption clause, but also to the scope of the clause).
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statute;3 and (4) the regulatory context of the statute. 35
The presence of a savings clause, along with a preemption clause,
adds another dimension to the preemption analysis. 136 Savings clauses
are statutory provisions that "limit the reach of an express preemption
clause, exempting state law claims... [without negating] the effect of
the preemption clause. ' 13 Congress generally includes a savings
clause when it anticipates common law claims in the area that the
statute regulates.138 Presumably, Congress includes a savings clause to
ensure that those claims that it wished to preserve are not
inadvertently preempted in the future.
2. Implied Preemption
If a statute does not contain a preemption provision, or if the
provision is ambiguous, then courts will consider whether the state law
is preempted by implication. 139 An implied preemption analysis looks
to the substantive provisions of the federal statute for evidence of
congressional intent to preempt.140 There are two types
of implied
42
preemption: field preemption 4 ' and conflict preemption.
Field preemption exists when the wording of a federal statute or its
legislative history evinces Congress's intent to exclusively occupy a
given regulatory field. 43 Accordingly, a field preemption inquiry
134. See id. at 486, 490 (examining the statute's general purpose and legislative
history to determine its scope); Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 518; Grey, supra note 100, at
566 (searching for the congressional purpose as demonstrated in the statute's
legislative history).
135. See Cipollone,505 U.S. at 513-15, 519; Grey, supra note 100, at 566.
136. See William W. Schwarzer, FederalPreemption-A Brief Analysis, 1997 ALIABA Resource Materials 693, 697.
137. Id. For example, the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966,
15 U.S.C. § 1381 (repealed 1994), contained a savings clause: "Compliance with any
Federal motor vehicle standard ... does not exempt any person from any liability
under common law." Id. § 1397(k). The FBSA contains a similar savings clause. See
supra part I.B.
138. See Lewis v. Brunswick Corp., 107 F.3d 1494, 1504 (11th Cir.), cert. granted,
118 S. Ct. 439 (1997), cert. dismissed, 118 S. Ct. 1793 (1998).
139. See Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 489 (1996); Grey, supra note 100, at
566. The Court has implied that Congress's inclusion of an express preemption clause
precludes the existence of implied preemption. See Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 517. But
this suggestion has not necessarily been followed. See, e.g., Freightliner Corp. v.
Myrick, 514 U.S. 280, 287-89 (1995) (stating that the Cipollone inference is not "a
categorical rule precluding the coexistence of express and implied preemption").
140. See Stabile, supra note 102, at 7-8.
141. Scholars have sometimes referred to "field preemption" by other names, such
as "implied field preemption," Grey, supra note 100, at 566, and "occupation of the
field," Klein, supra note 98, at 107. Substantively, however, there is no difference.
142. "Conflict preemption" is also commonly known by other names, such as
"conflicts preemption," Grey, supra note 100, at 566, and "actual conflict," Klein,
supra note 98, at 108. Again, there is no difference substantively.
143. See Grey, supra note 100, at 566 (defining field preemption as "when a system
of federal regulation is so comprehensive as to displace all state regulation"); Klein,
supra note 98, at 107 (defining field preemption as when "federal law 'touch[es] a
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focuses on the federal statute's language, legislative history, and
overall statutory scheme.1" Examples of Congress's exercise of field
preemption include nuclear safety regulation 145 and sedition."
Conflict preemption can arise in two ways: when compliance with
both state and federal law is impossible,4 7 or when state law frustrates
a federal objective.14" Under a conflict preemption analysis, there is
no longer a presumption against preemption because federal law
always trumps state law in a direct conflict under the Supremacy
Clause. 49 The test for the first prong of conflict preemption, the "dual
compliance" test, simply asks whether one can physically comply with
both the federal law and the state law, even though each contains a
different standard."
The second prong, the "frustration-ofobjectives" test, considers (1) the overall purpose and objective of the
federal law and (2) the impact of the state law's effect on the
execution of the federal objective.-"
This prong of conflict
preemption focuses on interpreting both standards-federal and
state-and considers how they interact with one another.
The doctrine of preemption and its basic tenets are well established
in the judicial system. At first glance, federal preemption appears
straightforward and uncomplicated. As part I demonstrates,
however, courts often interpret the doctrine of preemption and its
application in conflicting ways, which results in incongruous
outcomes. It takes a closer look at this phenomenon within the
context of the FBSA and state common law tort claims in propeller
injury cases.

field in which the federal interest is so dominant that the federal system will be
assumed to preclude enforcement of state laws on the same subject'") (alterations in
original) (citing Chicago & N.W. Transp. Co. v. Kalo Brick & Tile Co., 450 U.S. 311,
318 (1980)).
144. See Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238,249 (1984).
145. See id. (concluding after studying "the statutory scheme and legislative history
of the Atomic Energy Act" that "the Federal Government ...occupied the entire
field of nuclear safety concerns, except the limited powers expressly ceded to the
States" (internal quotations omitted)).
146. See Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497, 504 (1956) (finding a congressional
intent to occupy the field of sedition because the relevant federal acts "evince[d] a
congressional plan which [made] it reasonable to determine that no room has been
left for the States to supplement it").
147. See Grey, supra note 100, at 566-67.
148. See id at 567; Klein, supra note 98, at 108 (describing this prong of conflict
preemption as where "the state's common law 'stands as an obstacle to the
accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of the federal
law"') (citing Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)).
149. See supra part I.A.
150. See Klein, supra note 98, at 108 (including state common law within the term
"law").
151. See id.
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III. DIVISION IN THE COURTS: FEDERAL PREEMPTION OF
PROPELLER GUARD CLAIMS

In the typical propeller accident case, the plaintiff sues the motor
manufacturer under a common law negligence or products liability
152
theory for failing to install guards around the offending propeller.
The defendant-manufacturers raise a defense based on the FBSA's
preemption provision and the Coast Guard's decision not to mandate
propeller guards on recreational boating vehicles.'53 In all but two of
the eleven courts to decide a propeller guard case, plaintiff's claims
were found to be preempted.1 5 Of the courts finding preemption,
most held that the plaintiffs' claims were expressly preempted, 155 while
the remaining three courts held that the plaintiff's claims were
implicitly preempted.156 Only two courts denied any preemption,
either express or implied, of the plaintiff's claims. 57 This part
describes how these courts reached their conclusions.
A. The Majority View: The FBSA Preempts Common Law
PropellerGuard Claims
Nine courts have addressed the question of preemption of state
propeller guard claims and ruled in favor of preemption 58 Seven
courts concluded that the plaintiffs' claims were expressly
preempted, 59 while three courts held that the plaintiffs' claims were
implicitly preempted."6
1. Express Preemption of Propeller Guard Claims
Eight courts applied an express preemption analysis; seven of those
courts found that the FBSA expressly preempted the plaintiffs' state
common law tort claims based on a failure to install propeller
152. See supra text accompanying notes 19-21.
153. See supra text accompanying notes 22-24.
154. See infra part III.A. Of the twelve courts that have decided propeller guard
cases, only eleven applied preemption analyses. See supra note 25. The latter are the
cases discussed herein.
155. See infra part III.A.1.
156. See infra part III.A.2.
157. See infra part III.B.
158. See Lewis v. Brunswick Corp., 107 F.3d 1494, 1505-06 (11th Cir.), cert. granted,

118 S. Ct. 439 (1997), cert. dismissed, 118 S. Ct. 1793 (1998); Carstensen v. Brunswick
Corp., 49 F.3d 430, 432 (8th Cir. 1995); Moss v. Outboard Marine Corp., 915 F. Supp.
183, 187 (E.D. Cal. 1996); Shield v. Bayliner Marine Corp., 822 F. Supp. 81, 84 (D.
Conn. 1993); Davis v. Brunswick Corp., 854 F. Supp. 1574, 1583-84 (N.D. Ga. 1993),
on reconsiderationin part (Mar. 17, 1994); Shields v. Outboard Marine Corp., 776 F.
Supp. 1579, 1582 (M.D. Ga. 1991); Mowery v. Mercury Marine, Div. of Brunswick
Corp., 773 F. Supp. 1012, 1017 (N.D. Ohio 1991); Farner v. Brunswick Corp., 607
N.E.2d 562, 567 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992); Ryan v. Brunswick Corp., 531 N.W.2d 793, 79697 (Mich. Ct. App. 1995).
159. See infra part III.A.1.
160. See infra part III.A.2.
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guards.161 Express preemption exists where Congress drafts a statute
that includes language explicitly defining the areas in which the
federal statute preempts state law.' 2 In their analyses, these courts, in
accordance with the principles of preemption analysis, considered
congressional intent and presumed initially that there was no
preemption." Still, these courts found that the FBSA's inclusion of a
preemption clause"6 sufficiently showed the "'reliable indicium of
congressional intent' necessary to preempt the propeller guard

claims.' 6

The courts next analyzed whether a decision not to regulate
propeller guards constituted a federal law or regulation. If the
decision amounted to a federal law or regulation, then no state law or
regulation could differ under the FBSA.11 These courts held that the

Coast Guard's recommendation not to mandate propeller guards had
"the same preemptive force as a decision to regulate,""6 because the
decision yielded the same result as the enactment of a regulation
preventing the states from requiring propeller guards. 168 This resulted
in a deliberate absence of federal regulation of propeller guards.169 As
such, manufacturers could freely choose whether or not to install
propeller guards on their motors. 170 Therefore, any state law or
regulation mandating the use of propeller guards would not mirror the
Coast Guard's regulatory position and would conflict with federal law,
which is prohibited by the FBSA. 171
161. See Lewis, 107 F.3d at 1501; Carstensen, 49 F.3d at 433; Moss, 915 F. Supp. at
186; Shield, 822 F. Supp. at 84; Davis, 854 F. Supp. at 1580; Mowery, 773 F. Supp. at
1017; Farner,607 N.E.2d at 567; Ryan, 531 N.W2d at 797. Lewis applied an expresspreemption analysis, but failed to find a case for express preemption. See 107 F.3d at
1501.
162. See supra part II.B.1.
163. See Lewis, 107 F.3d at 1500; Davis, 854 F. Supp. at 1579; Farner,607 N.E.2d at
565; Ryan, 531 N.W.2d at 795; supra part II.B.1.
164. The FBSA's preemption clause, in short, forbids the establishment,
continuance, or enforcement of any state law or regulation different from federal
regulation with respect to recreational boating safety. See 46 U.S.C. § 4306 (1994).
For the full text of the FBSA preemption clause, see supra note 51.
165. Carstensen, 49 F.3d at 432 (quoting Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S.
504,517 (1992)).
166. See 46 U.S.C. § 4306.
167. Carstensen, 49 F.3d at 431; accord Moss v. Outboard Marine Corp., 915 F.
Supp. 183,186 (E.D. Cal. 1996); Ryan, 531 N.W.2d at 795.
168. See Ryan, 531 N.W.2d at 796.
169. See id.
170. See Moss, 915 F. Supp. at 186; accord Mowery v. Mercury Marine, Div. of
Brunswick Corp., 773 F. Supp. 1012, 1016 (N.D. Ohio 1991); Ryan, 531 N.W.2d at 796
(quoting Mowery, 773 F. Supp. at 1016).
171. See Carstensen, 49 F.3d at 431; Moss, 915 F. Supp. at 186; see also Davis v.
Brunswick Corp., 854 F. Supp. 1574, 1580 (N.D. Ga. 1993), on reconsiderationin part
(Mar. 17, 1994) (finding a "general conflict ...between uniform federal regulation of
boat safety as envisioned by the [FBSA] and state common law damages actions");
Ryan, 531 N.W.2d at 796 (stating that "any award of damages to plaintiff would be
based on a determination that Michigan law requires the installation and use of
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These courts also considered whether the language, state "law or
regulation," in the FBSA's preemption clause 172 encompassed state
common law.173 If the language encompassed state common law, then
the FBSA preempts such claims. 74 These courts found that the FBSA
term state "law or regulation" included common law claims even if the
175
preemption clause did not on its face refer to common law actions.
First, the FBSA's use of such broad language allowed for the
1 76
interpretation that common law claims are implicitly included.
Second, the courts found no reason to distinguish between positive
enactments and common law because the final effect of either was the
same-a form of state regulation.'7 Under this analysis, allowing a
jury to assess damages for failure to install a propeller guard would
effectively create a state requirement to install guards.178 Jury awards

on a state tort law claim essentially fine defendants for noncompliance
with a jury imposed state standard.1 79 Thus, the enforcement of such
awards rises to a form of state regulation because the standard is state
based and state created.18 The FBSA's preemption clause explicitly
forbids such state interference. 81 Furthermore, permitting such an
outcome would allow a jury to create standards that even state

legislatures could not create. 182
In some of these cases, plaintiffs argued that the FBSA's savings
clause 83 preserved their right to sue.184 The courts rejected this
propeller guards on recreational boats").
172. See 46 U.S.C. § 4306 (1994).
173. See Carstensen, 49 F.3d at 431-32; Moss, 915 F. Supp. at 186; Farner v.
Brunswick Corp., 607 N.E.2d 562,567 (11. App. Ct. 1992).
174. See Moss, 915 F. Supp. at 186.
175. See Carstensen, 49 F.3d at 431-32; Moss, 915 F. Supp. at 186; Farner, 607
N.E.2d at 567.
176. See Carstensen, 49 F.3d at 431-32; Moss, 915 F. Supp. at 186; Farner, 607
N.E.2d at 567 (stating that the "use of the word 'law' in Section 4306 further
evidences Congress' intent that no common-law tort action be maintained based on
the lack of a propeller guard" and that "[s]tate law clearly embraces the common
law").
177. See Carstensen, 49 F.3d at 432; Moss, 915 F. Supp. at 186; Davis v. Brunswick
Corp., 854 F. Supp. 1574, 1580 (N.D. Ga. 1993), on reconsiderationin part (Mar. 17,
1994).
178. See Carstensen,49 F.3d at 432; Moss, 915 F. Supp. at 186; Davis, 854 F. Supp.
at 1580.
179. See Moss, 915 F. Supp. at 186. A jury award in a common law claim results in
an "'obligation to pay compensation."' Id. (quoting Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc.,
505 U.S. 504, 521 (1992)).
180. See id. Jury awards can be "a potent method of governing conduct and
controlling policy." Id. (quoting Cipollone,505 U.S. at 521).
181. See Davis, 854 F. Supp. at 1580.
182. See id. (finding that this outcome "would allow a jury to perform a function
from which the fifty states' legislative bodies are precluded"); Mowery v. Mercury
Marine, Div. of Brunswick Corp., 773 F. Supp. 1012,1017 (N.D. Ohio 1991).
183. For the full text of the savings clause, see supra note 60 and accompanying
text.
184. See Carstensen v. Brunswick Corp., 49 F.3d 430, 432 (8th Cir. 1995); Moss, 915
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argument because interpreting the savings clause as such would thwart
the FBSA's goal of establishing uniform boating safety
requirements. 18s Instead, the courts reasoned that the clause should
be read as saving only those common law claims that are not expressly
preempted.""
In response, some plaintiffs argued that this
interpretation of the savings clause rendered it superfluous.' The
courts disagreed, stating that the savings clause's purpose was not to
preserve all common law claims, but to prevent the preemption of
claims in which the defense is based solely on compliance with the
federal law.'
in other words, the clause was meant to prevent a
manufacturer from relying on its compliance with the minimum safety
standards set forth in the FBSA as a defense to state common law
claims of defective design.'89 Therefore, the savings clause is
inapplicable in the absence of an affirmative requirement to install
propeller guards. 190
Of the majority, only the Eleventh Circuit, in Lewis v. Bnmswick
Corp., considered and failed to find express preemption."' In Lewis,
the Eleventh Circuit construed the FBSA's preemption clause
narrowly because the FBSA related to safety, an area generally
reserved for state regulation through its police powers.'91
It
recognized that the FBSA's use of the terms "law and regulation [in
its preemption clause] evidence[d] an intent to include common law
claims."' 1 3 But, the savings clause prevented a conclusion of complete
preemption of all common law claims because the savings clause
definitely saved at least some common law claims from preemption.'14
The Eleventh Circuit did not elaborate on its reasoning, but
presumably the presence of the savings clause itself was sufficient to
preclude a finding of express preemption. 9
F. Supp. at 186-87; Mowery, 773 F. Supp. at 1017; Farner v. Brunswick Corp., 607
N.E.2d 562,567 (II1. App. CL 1992).

185. See Carstensen, 49 F.3d at 432; Moss, 915 F. Supp. at 187 (stating that the
clause should not be read to save common law rights inconsistent with the FBSA);
Farner,607 N.E.2d at 567.
186. See Carstensen, 49 F.3d at 432; Moss, 915 F. Supp. at 187.

187. See, eg., Carstensen, 49 F3d at 432 (discussing the potential effects of the
FBSA's savings clause on the preemption analysis).
188. See, eg., id (stating that interpreting the savings clause to save "only those
common law claims that are not expressly preempted" does not "render the savings
clause superfluous").
189. See id. at 432-33; Mowery, 773 F. Supp. at 1017; Farner,607 N.E2d at 567.
190. See Moss, 915 F. Supp. at 186; Mowery, 773 F. Supp. at 1017; Farner,607
N.E.2d at 567.
191. See 107 F.3d 1494, 1501 (11th Cir.), cert. granted, 118 S. Ct. 439 (1997), cert.
dismissed, 118 S. Ct. 1793 (1998). However, the Lewis court found a case for implied
preemption. See i. at 1505; supra part II.B.2.
192. See Lewis, 107 F.3d at 1501.
193. Id. (internal quotations omitted).
194. See id.
195. See id.
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Most courts that considered the federal preemption of state
common law claims mandating propeller guards found that the
FBSA's preemption clause, coupled with the Coast Guard's decision
not to require guards, expressly preempted the plaintiff's tort based
claims. These decisions focused on the inclusion of a preemption
clause in the FBSA, the preemption clause's use of broad language
(i.e., the phrase "state law or regulation") and the regulatory effect of
jury awards. In each of these cases finding express preemption, the

courts held that the FBSA's savings clause failed to preserve the
plaintiff's propeller guard claims.
2. The Implied Preemption of Propeller Guard Claims
Three courts have held that the FBSA implicitly preempts common

law claims for failure to install propeller guards.191 Only one court
considered and found field preemption, 197 but all three applied the
conflict prong of the implied preemption analysis and found that the
plaintiffs' claims frustrated the FBSA's regulatory scheme. 98
The only case to find field preemption was Shields v. Outboard
Marine Corp.199 Its brief field preemption analysis stated that the
Coast Guard's decision not to regulate propeller guard use implied
that the area should remain free of regulation.2 00 Consequently, the

court reasoned that the FBSA prohibits states from enacting
regulations in this area, even if they do so under their police powers.",
Because jury awards in this case would amount to a state regulation
22
inconsistent with other regulations, such claims are prohibited. 0
Under conflict preemption, on the other hand, the applicable test
was whether the plaintiff's claims frustrated the objectives of the
FBSA's regulatory scheme."° Both Lewis and Davis v. Brunswick
196. See id. at 1494; Davis v. Brunswick Corp., 854 F. Supp. 1574 (N.D. Ga. 1993),
on reconsideration in part (Mar. 17, 1994); Shields v. Outboard Marine Corp., 776 F.
Supp. 1579, 1581-82 (M.D. Ga. 1991). Both Lewis and Davis first applied an express
preemption analysis before considering implied preemption. See Lewis, 107 F.3d at
1500-02; Davis, 854 F. Supp. at 1581. The Davis court found express preemption of
the plaintiffs claims, see 854 F. Supp. at 1581, while the Lewis court did not. See 107
F.3d at 1502. The Davis court proceeded to apply the implied preemption analysis in
recognition of conflicting case law in that jurisdiction. See 854 F. Supp. at 1581. The
Shields analysis failed to clearly distinguish between an express and implied
preemption analysis. See 776 F. Supp. at 1581-82.
197. See Shields, 776 F. Supp. at 1581. Lewis and Davis did not apply the other
prong of implied preemption analysis, nor did their decisions indicate why.
198. See Lewis, 107 F.3d at 1494; Davis, 854 F. Supp. at 1574; supra notes 147-51.
In fact, there is substantial evidence that Congress encouraged state involvement in
regulating recreational boating safety. See supra part I.A.B.
199. 776 F. Supp. at 1581.
200. See id. (stating that the decision "implied a decision that this area is best left
unregulated, which has as much preemptive effect as a decision to regulate").
201. See id.
202. See id.
203. See Lewis, 107 F.3d at 1502; Davis, 854 F. Supp. at 1581 (examining "whether
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Corp. noted that the presumption against preemption did not apply
under a conflict preemption analysis' 0 ' because under the Supremacy
Clause federal law prevails over state lav whenever a conflict arises.
In their analyses, each court took its own approach and emphasized
different elements.
The Lewis court's finding of implied preemption relied heavily on
Congress's designation of the Coast Guard as the exclusive regulatory
authority under the FBSA.6 Because the Coast Guard had the
exclusive authority to promulgate safety standards, "an absence of
federal regulation under the FBSA mean[t] that no regulation, state
or federal, [was] appropriate."'
The court found this reasoning
especially persuasive in light of the Coast Guard's affirmative
decision, made after conducting a thorough study, to refrain from
mandating propeller guards.308 According to the court, Congress's
intent to create a uniform system of regulation and the Coast Guard's
decision not to require propeller guards mandated an absence of both
federal and state propeller guard regulation?1 9 Lewis found that
claims based on the failure to install a safety device that the Coast
Guard had decided not to require would conflict with the FBSA's
goals of regulatory uniformity.2 10 In the court's view, the Lewis'
product liability claims for damages in effect sought the imposition of
a propeller guard requirement. 1' Such a requirement would conflict
with the FBSA's grant of exclusive regulatory authority over boating
safety to the federal government. Thus, the plaintiff's claims were
implicitly preempted.2 2
In contrast, the Davis court focused on the FBSA's purpose of
providing "uniform standards without the imposition of excessive
special requirements by individual states. '213 The court reasoned that
the FBSA's intent, coupled with the Coast Guard's decision not to
regulate, meant that Congress intended for flexibility in FBSA

state law would potentially frustrate the federal scheme"); Shields, 776 F. Supp. at

1581.
204. See Lewis, 107 F.3d at 1502; Davis, 854 F. Supp. at 1581.
205. See Lewis, 107 F.3d at 1502 ("Under the Supremacy Clause of the Federal
Constitution, [tihe relative importance to the State of its own law is not material when
there is a conflict with a valid federal law, for any state law, however clearly within a
State's acknowledged power, which interferes with or is contrary to federal law, must
yield." (internal quotations omitted)).
206. See id. at 1505.
207. Id. at 1504.
208. See id.
209. See id
210. See id.
211. See id
212. See id. at 1505.
213. See Davis v. Brunswick Corp., 854 F. Supp. 1574, 1581 (N.D. Ga. 1993), on
reconsiderationin part (Mar. 17, 1994) (citing H.R. Rep. No. 98-338, at 160 (1983),
reprintedin 1983 U.S.C.C.A.N. 924,972).
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regulation.21 4 Under the federal standard established by the Coast
Guard, manufacturers had the option, but not the obligation, to outfit
motors with propeller guards. 215 As the Davis court saw it, allowing a
jury to find a design defect for failure to install a propeller guard
would effectively remove the choice conferred by the federal
standard. 216 Thus, allowing such claims would frustrate the uniform
regulation that Congress desired in passing the FBSA, and the
plaintiff's claims were implicitly preempted.2 17
Alternatively, the court in Shields focused on the effect of the
savings clause.2 8 Shields concluded that allowing these claims would
thwart the overall purpose of the FBSA-standardizing boat
manufacturing regulations. 219 According to the court, awarding these
claims would "set a precedent for allowing other juries nationwide to
decide questions of boat safety, which would result in a patchwork of
regulations clearly inconsistent with the purpose of the Act. ' '22
Moreover, the court reasoned that the savings clause did not save the
plaintiff's claims because the savings clause demonstrated that
Congress did not intend to monopolize the area of recreational boat
safety regulation.221 Rather, the savings clause was intended to
preserve common law claims "based on state statutes and
regulations... identical to those in the [FBSA] and [that] do not
conflict with its objectives."'
Thus, the savings clause would not
have saved these claims because doing so would conflict with the
Coast Guard's decision not to require propeller guards and
with the
3
FBSA's requirement of uniformity in boating regulation.
The Shields court also considered whether the section of the FBSA
exempting differing state regulation for uniquely hazardous local
conditions applied. 4 But the court quickly dismissed this possibility
because of insufficient evidence to establish the existence of a
uniquely hazardous local condition.2" The plaintiffs argument that
the defendant's motor was defectively designed for lack of a propeller
guard could have been made in any location, and thus the exemption
was inapplicable. 226
214. See Davis, 854 F. Supp. at 1582.
215. See id.

216.
217.
218.
1991).
219.

See id.
See id.
See Shields v. Outboard Marine Corp., 776 F. Supp. 1579, 1581-82 (M.D. Ga.
See id. at 1581.

220. Id.

221. See id. at 1582.
222 Id.
223. See id.
224. See id.; supra text accompanying notes 56-59; see also infra note 311
(discussing one locale where this exception may be applicable).
225. See Shields, 776 F. Supp. at 1582.
226. See id.; infra note 311 for a discussion of when such a situation may arise.
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In sum, three courts found that the FBSA implicitly preempted the
plaintiff's claims. While Shields was the sole case to find evidence of
field preemption, all three courts found a sufficient base for conflict
preemption. Lewis focused on the similarity between the effect of a
jury award for damages and that of a positive enactment, Davis
focused on the FBSA's emphasis on uniformity, 2 and Shields
emphasized the effect of the savings clause.229 Despite these
differences, all three held that allowing the plaintiff's claims would
frustrate the overall objective of the FBSA.
B. The Minority View: The FBSA Does Not Preempt Propeller
Guard Claims
Of those courts facing the question of the FBSA's preemption of
propeller guard claims, only two have held that the FBSA neither
expressly nor implicitly preempted these common law claims.3
1. No Express Preemption of Propeller Guard Claims
Defendants in both Ard v. Jensen and Moore v. Brunswick Bowling
& Billiards Corp. claimed that the FBSA's preemption clause, along
with the Coast Guard's decision not to require propeller guards,
expressly preempted the plaintiffs' claims. Neither court, however,
found a valid case of express preemption.21
Ard held that the combination of the FBSA's preemption and
savings clauses preserved the plaintiff's claims. - The court's express
preemption analysis focused on the scope of the savings clause and
whether it preserved the plaintiff's claims.3 3 The court first concluded
that Congress intended to protect boat manufacturers from complying
with differing federal and state regulations.P However, the court
thought it unlikely that Congress would permit manufacturers to build
boats and boating equipment so dangerous that juries would impose
liability for introducing them into the stream of commerce 35
The defendants made three arguments in favor of preemption
227. See Lewis v. Brunswick Corp., 107 F.3d 1494,1502-05 (11th Cir.), cert. granted,
118 S. Ct. 439 (1997), cert. dismissed, 118 S. Ct. 1793 (1998).
228. See Davis v. Brunswick Corp., 854 F. Supp. 1574, 1581 (N.D. Ga. 1993), on
reconsiderationin part(Mar. 17,1994).
229. See Shields, 776 F. Supp. at 1581-82.
230. See Ard v. Jensen, 996 S.W.2d 594, 596 (Mo. Ct. App. 1999); Moore v.
Brunswick Bowling & Billiards Corp., 889 S.W.d 246,247 (Tex. 1994).
231. See Ard, 996 S.W.2d at 596; Moore, 889 S.W.2d at 247-48. Even in Moore,
Chief Justice Phillips of the Supreme Court of Texas, joined by two other justices,
argued in dissent for federal preemption. See Moore, 889 S.W.2d at 252 (Phillips, J.,
dissenting).
232. See Ard, 996 S.W.2d at 596-601.
233. See id at 598-601.
234. See id. at 598-99.
235. See id.
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regarding the effect of the savings clause.3 6 First, defendants claimed
that the savings clause did not preserve the plaintiff's claims because
such an interpretation would neutralize the effect of the preemption
clause. 237 Second, defendants argued that savings clauses in general
should not be interpreted so that common law claims could frustrate a
federal regulatory scheme.238 Finally, defendants contended that the
savings clause's purpose was to preserve claims relating to defectively
installed equipment."
The Ard court dismissed each of these defenses. First, the court
found that allowing the savings clause to preserve the plaintiff's claims
would not nullify the preemption clause.240 Instead, the court's
interpretation would save only common law claims, while still
permitting the preemption clause to preempt those positive
enactments of state regulatory agencies that differ from federal
standards. 241 According to the court, Congress intended for the
common law to establish minimum standards of behavior for boating
manufacturers and for the FBSA to impose any higher standards.242
The court also declined to include common law claims within the term
"state laws or regulation" because of the presence of the savings
clause and the presumption against preemption.2 43
Second, the court dismissed the defendants' contention that this
interpretation of the savings clause undermined the FBSA's
regulatory scheme.2' Defendants contended that a general savings
clause could not save common law claims, that if successful, would be
absolutely inconsistent with the FBSA. 245 The court responded that
even though uniformity was one of the FBSA's goals, Congress did
not want manufacturers to avoid liability by claiming compliance with
the FBSA.246 Allowing these claims would not obstruct the FBSA's
goal of uniformity because Congress intended only to determine
whether or not to require propeller guards, and not "whether a
manufacturer could be held liable for a defective design or
unreasonable danger because of a lack of propeller guard. 2 47 From
the court's view, the defendants' attempt to use the Coast Guard's
236. See id. at 599-600. Plaintiff, Ard, sued several defendants, including the driver
of the boat, Jensen, the boat manufacturer, Glaston, Inc., and the motor
manufacturer, Brunswick Corp. See id. at 596.
237. See id. at 599.
238. See id. at 599-600.
239. See id. at 600.
240. See id. at 599.
241. See id.
242. See id.
243. See id.
244. See id. at 599-600.
245. See id.
246. See id. at 600.
247. Id. (stating that Congress "specifically announced it wanted to allow those
claims").
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decision not to require propeller guards as a preemption defense was
equivalent to the defense of meeting minimum standards to preclude
liability, which the savings clause forbade.24
Third, the court also dismissed the defendants' argument that the
savings clause saved only claims based on defectively designed
products that had actually been installed, as opposed to a claim based
on not installing a product.249 The court advocated reading the statute
according to its ordinary meaning 5 0 In doing so, the court noted that
both the statute and its legislative history lacked any distinction
between design and installation, and that the FBSA's broad language
cut against such a finding of preemption.2s '
Finally, the Ard court dismissed the defendants' attempt to
persuade the court with other cases that had found preemption under
similar circumstances.252 Emphasizing that "preemption is the
exception rather than the rule," the court implied that those other
cases were wrongly decided because those decisions, unlike the Ard
court's decisions, failed to follow the general presumption against
preemption required in preemption analysisP5
In Moore, the defendant argued that the FBSA's preemption
clause, along with the Coast Guard's recommendation not to require
propeller guards, expressly preempted the plaintiff's claims.P The
defendant reasoned that the language "law or regulation" in the
preemption clause extended to the plaintiff's claims because jury
awards effectively require "defendant companies to install propeller
guards upon threat of liability.""5 According to the defendant, the
effect of such an award was tantamount to state regulation, and would
result in a prohibited conflict between state and federal policy under
the preemption clause. 6
The court rejected each of the defendant's arguments. First, the
court considered whether the term "law" in the FBSA referred to
both common and statutory law.25 Acknowledging that the term has
been held to include common law in other cases and the potential
regulatory effect of jury awards, the Moore court nonetheless declined
to follow the majority view. According to the court, the guiding
248. See id.; supra text accompanying note 246.
249. See Ard, 996 S.W.2d at 600 (citing Mowery v. Mercury Marine, Division of
Brunswick Corp., 773 F. Supp. 1012,1017 (N.D. Ohio 1991)).
250. See id.
251. See id
252. See id. at 600-01.
253. Id.
254. See Moore v. Brunswick Bowling & Billiards Corp., 889 S.W2d 246,248 (Tex.
1994).
255. Id. at 249.
256. See id.
257. See id.
258. See id. at 249-50.
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presumption against preemption and the term's location in a
preemption provision required a narrower construction of the phrase
"state law" than would be required in a non-preemption context.2 9
The court also stated that the effect of jury awards was indirect, and
thus not equivalent to positive enactments. 260 As a result, the court
refused to liberally interpret "law or regulation" to include any
common law claims, and consequently the plaintiff's claims as well.261
The court provided additional reasons for narrowly construing the
term "law or regulation. '262 First, had Congress wished the
preemption clause to include common law claims, it would have
drafted it accordingly as it has in the past.263 Second, the existence of a
savings clause evidenced Congress's ability to "explicitly refer to
common law when it so desired," as well as indicating the absence of
congressional intent to preempt all state common law claims under
the FBSA.264 The defendant argued that the savings clause merely
saved those claims based on "state regulations and statutes...
identical to federal ones. 265 But the court rejected this interpretation
because such claims would be preserved regardless of the savings
clause, and thus this interpretation would "render the savings clause
redundant. ' '26 Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the court noted
its strong interest in preserving state citizens' redress for recreational
boating injuries sustained on the state's waterways, especially because
267
the FBSA failed to provide any other remedies for the plaintiffs.
2. No Implied Preemption of Propeller Guard Claims
Only Moore considered whether plaintiff's propeller guard claims

259. See id. at 249 ("[Tlhe presumption against pre-emption might give good
reason to construe the phrase 'state law' in a pre-emption provision more narrowly
than an identical phrase in another context ..... (quoting Cipollone v. Liggett Group,
Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 522 (1992))).

260. See id. at 249-50. According to the Moore court, "Congress may reasonably
determine in a given case that the incidental regulatory pressure of state common-law

actions is acceptable when direct state regulatory authority is not." Id. at 250 (quoting
Goodyear Atomic Corp. v. Miller, 486 U.S. 174, 186 (1988) (internal quotations and
citations omitted)).

261. See id.
262- See id.
263. See id.; see, e.g., Domestic Housing and International Recovery and Financial
Stability Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 1715z-17(d), 1715z-18(e) (1994) (preempting any "State
constitution, statute, court decree, common law, rule, or public policy"); Copyright

Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 301(b) (1994) (preempting rights "under the common law or
statutes of any State").
264. Moore, 889 S.W.2d at 250.
265. Id.
266. Id. (noting that even if the preemption clause "applie[d] to common-law

actions, it would not bar an action establishing a standard 'identical' to a federal
standard").
267. See id. at 251.
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were implicitly preempted.m
Ard concluded that an implied
preemption analysis was unnecessary because the FBSA's express
preemption clause precluded such.2 9 Moore ultimately did not find
implied preemption.270
The Moore defendant contended that a jury award for the plaintiff's
claim would result in conflict preemption because such an award
would undermine the FBSA's goal of uniformity?' Specifically, the
defendant claimed that a jury award would have resulted in a
requirement to install propeller guards, which would differ from the
Coast Guard's decision not to mandate guards.tm According to the
defendant, a decision not to regulate can "have the same preemptive
effect as a decision to regulate. ' '2 u
Despite this possibility of conflict, the court did not believe that it
warranted a finding of preemption 74 According to the court, it was
possible that the Coast Guard did not mean to preclude state liability
through its decision not to mandate guards 7 5 First, the court
postulated that the difference between the regulatory effect of
damage awards and that of positive enactments is that in the former
situation, a manufacturer may still choose to not install a guard and
risk liability.276 Second, the court believed that the savings clause

reflected Congress's readiness to accept tension between uniform
federal regulations and awards for tort liability at the state level!"m
Lastly, the court recognized that, although its holding conflicted with
the holdings of four other courts that had considered the same issue,
the reasoning of those courts was unpersuasive in light of the Supreme
Court's "apparent turn to stricter preemption analysis."' 87
Thus, the minority holds that the FBSA and the Coast Guard's
268. See id. at 251-52.
269. See Ard v. Jensen, 996 S.W.2d 594, 601 n.11 (Mo. Ct. App. 1999). In Ard, the
court stated that the "inference that an express pre-emption clause forecloses implied
pre-emption" applies. See id(quoting Freightliner Corp. v. Myrick, 514 U.S. 280,28889 (1995)) (discussing the Cipollone inference that where there is an express
preemption clause entirely forecloses any possibility of implied preemption); supra
note 139.
270. See Moore, 889 S.W.2d at 251-52.
271. See id. at 251; supra text accompanying notes 147-51.
272- See Moore, 889 S.W.2d at 251.
273. Id.
274. See id.
("We recognize this potential for conflict, but do not think it justifies a
holding of preemption.").
275. See id.
276. See id.
277. See id. at 252.
278. Id. at 252. The "apparent turn to stricter preemption analysis" refers to the
Cipollone inference, discussed supra notes 138 and 269, that implied preemption
cannot exist where there is an express preemption clause. See id. at 252 n.10.

Therefore, the court was not persuaded by the defendant's argument, which the court
viewed as similar to an implied preemption argument. See id.Thus, it seems that the
Moore court applied the implied preemption analysis merely for the sake of
discussion.
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decision not to require propeller guards neither expressly nor
implicitly preempt the plaintiff's claim of failure to install a propeller
guard. Ard based its conclusion primarily on a narrow interpretation
of the effect of the FBSA's savings clause, and emphasized the
presumption against preemption. Moore focused on a narrow
interpretation of the FBSA's preemption clause and emphasized a
strong state interest in protecting its citizens' right to compensation
for injury. Part IV argues, contrary to this minority view, that while
the FBSA does not expressly preempt, it does implicitly preempt
plaintiffs' common law tort claims requiring propeller guards.
IV. THE FBSA AND THE COAST GUARD'S DECISION IMPLICITLY
PREEMPT STATE COMMON LAW PROPELLER GUARD CLAIMS

Under the doctrine of federal preemption, federal laws may either
expressly or implicitly preempt state common law claims.279 This part

argues that although the FBSA fails to expressly preempt state
common law claims for liability based on a failure to install propeller
guards, it implicitly preempts such claims.
A. Express PreemptionAnalysis
For the FBSA to expressly preempt state common law propeller
guard claims, it must include statutory language explicitly expressing
congressional intent to preempt.20 If such language is present,
express preemption is presumed and courts turn to statutory
construction to determine whether the statute's preemptive scope
extends to the claims at issue.281 Because federal preemption
inherently raises the danger of federal encroachment upon state
sovereignty, its analysis requires an overall presumption against
preemption. 2 The ultimate touchstone of preemption is therefore
congressional intent. 3
Congress's intent for the FBSA to preempt at least some state law is
readily apparent. The FBSA contains an express preemption clause
entitled "Federal preemption," providing clear and manifest proof of
congressional intent for the FBSA to preempt "state laws and
regulations."'
The preemption clause's language and text also
support an inference of preemption.' Finally, the FBSA's legislative
279.
280.
281.
282.

See supra part II.B.
See supra part II.B.1.
See supra part II.B.1.
See supra part II.B.1.

283. See supra note 102.
284. 46 U.S.C. § 4306 (1994). The FBSA's preemption clause is similar to other
express preemption provisions, such as that in Cipollone v. Liggett Group Inc.,
similarly entitled "Preemption." 505 U.S. 504,514 (1992).
285. The plain language of the FBSA's preemption provision is also similar to
those confronted in other express preemption cases. See, e.g., The Federal Boat Safety
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history emphasizes federal and state regulatory uniformity,
specifically emphasizing that state "laws or regulations" should be
identical to federal regulations.8
A definitive intent to preempt, however, still leaves open the
question of the preemption clause's scope, which is determined via
statutory construction.w Congress's intent here depends on whether
the term "state law or regulation" encompasses positive enactments
and state common law, the effect of the Coast Guard's decision not to
mandate propeller guards, and the effect of the FBSA's savings
clause. A close analysis demonstrates that Congress's intent to
preempt state common law regulation regarding the installation of
propeller guards is far from clear. Therefore, there is no express
preemption.
Congress's use of the term "state law or regulation" is vague and
fails to support a finding of express preemption. While the term "law
and regulation" clearly encompasses positive enactments, its
application to state common law is ambiguous.s One view is that
Congress's failure to use language explicitly referring to common law
in the FBSA's language demonstrates that common law claims are not
included. 2s9 This argument asserts that Congress specifically refers to
common law in statutory provisions when it intends its inclusion.9
The contrary view is that courts have found the term "state law," even
without further clarification, is broad enough to include both common
law and positive enactments.29' Nothing in the FBSA or its legislative
history suggests which view governs in this context. The proper
interpretation of the term "law and regulation" is ambiguous, and thus
Act of 1971,46 U.S.C. § 4306 (1994) ("[A] State or political subdivision of a State may
not establish, continue in effect, or enforce a law or regulation ... that is not identical
to a regulation prescribed under [this Act]."); Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470,
481 (1996) ("[No State or political subdivision of a State may establish or continue in
effect... any requirement ... which is different from, or in addition to, any
requirement applicable under this [federal law]." (citing the Medical Device
Amendments of 1976, 21 U.S.C. § 360k(a) (1994)); Freightliner Corp. v. Myrick, 514
U.S. 280,284 (1995) ("[N]o State ... shall have any authority either to establish, or to
continue in effect,
... any safety standard ... which is not identical to the Federal standard." (citing the
National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966,15 U.S.C. § 1392(d) (repealed
1994)).
286. See supra part I.A.
287. See supra note 130.
288. See supra notes 172-76 and accompanying text.
289. See supra text accompanying notes 262-64.
290. See Moore v. Brunswick Bowling & Billiards Corp., 889 S.W.2d 246,250 (Tex.
1994); see also Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 487 (1996) (stating that "if
Congress intended to preclude all common-law causes of action," it would have used
a word such as "remedy," which clearly included common law claims, rather than
"requirement").
291. See Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 522 (1992) (Stevens, J.,
plurality opinion) (stating that the phrase "state law" has included common law ever
since ErieRailroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938)).
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so is the scope of the FBSA's preemption clause. Because all
ambiguity must be resolved against preemption2 g9 one must conclude
that the FBSA's preemption clause fails to encompass state common
law. As such, the preemption clause does not reach state common law
claims, and the FBSA does not preempt such claims.
The Coast Guard's decision not to mandate propeller guards
further complicates the scope and effect of the FBSA's preemption
provision .21 For the preemption provision to apply to these propeller
guard claims, the Coast Guard's decision must be tantamount to
federal regulation.294 If one views a decision not to mandate propeller
guards as an affirmative decision to leave the area unregulated, then
the decision constitutes regulation.2 95 Accordingly, under this view
any award for damages based on a state jury imposed legal standard
would constitute a state regulation "not identical" to federal nonregulation, and hence would indicate preemption. 96 Alternatively,
one can argue that the Coast Guard's decision signified an intent to
refrain from federal regulation to leave the field open for state
regulation.2 9 Under this view, a state jury imposed legal standard,
and consequently plaintiffs' claims, would not be preempted.298
Again, while either interpretation is plausible, the narrower
interpretation should prevail because of the presumption against
preemption.2 9 Thus, the Coast Guard's decision does not have the
force of regulation causing a conflict with any jury award based on
propeller guard claims.
Finally, the inclusion of a savings clause in the FBSA also cuts
against a finding of express preemption. The inclusion of the savings
clause3°° indicates a congressional intent to save at least some state
292. See Lewis v. Brunswick Corp., 107 F.3d 1494, 1501 (11th Cir.), cert. granted,
118 S. Ct. 439 (1997), cert. dismissed, 118 S. Ct. 1793 (1998) (stating that doubts must
be resolved" in favor of the narrower interpretation of the preemption clause"); Grey,
supra note 100, at 565 (arguing that courts should be wary of finding preemption
where there is statutory ambiguity).
293. See supra part I.C.
294. See 46 U.S.C. § 4306 (1994).
295. See supra notes 166-71 and accompanying text.
296. See supra notes 166-71 and accompanying text.
297. Cf Freightliner Corp. v. Myrick, 514 U.S. 280, 284 (1995) (stating that the
federal statute expressly permitted states to regulate until differing federal regulations
were enacted).
298. See id. at 282 (failing to find plaintiffs claims either expressly or implicitly
preempted).
299. The better argument here is the former. Treating the Coast Guard's decision
as if it intended to leave the issue to state regulation disregards the conclusions and
recommendations outlined in its propeller guard report. See supra part I.C. In
deciding whether to mandate propeller guards on boats, the Coast Guard considered
the Subcommittee's extensive study on the feasibility of such a requirement. See supra
part I.B. Only upon discovering several significant drawbacks to using propeller
guards as they existed at the time of the report, did the Coast Guard decline to
require guards. See supra part I.C.
300. See 46 U.S.C. § 4311(g) (1994); supra notes 60-65 and accompanying text.
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common law claims from preemption.301 Arguably, the mere presence
of the clause is sufficient to preclude express preemption because it
automatically creates ambiguity over which claims are saved. Express
preemption requires a much clearer standard.m
Regardless, the savings clause specifically states that only those
claims that are "based on state statutes and regulations... identical to
those in the [FBSA] and [which] do not conflict with its objectives"
are preserved. 3' The FBSA is silent on the use of propeller guards
because it neither mandates nor precludes propeller guard use, and
the Coast Guard only subsequently decided not to mandate them.
Whether these two elements amount to federal regulation is unclear.
Consequently, there is no federal standard with which to be
"identical." Without a federal standard, the application of the savings
clause to propeller guard claims is ambiguous, which is unacceptable
to a finding of express preemption.
The FBSA therefore fails to expressly preempt plaintiffs' common
law propeller guard claims. Both the scope of the preemption clause
and the effect of the Coast Guard's decision not to regulate propeller
guard use are too ambiguous to establish express preemption. The
inclusion of the savings clause in the FBSA only strengthens this
conclusion.
B. Implied PreemptionAnalysis
The absence of express preemption does not preclude a finding of
implied preemption.3 Although the FBSA fails to support a case for
field preemption, it supports a case for conflict preemption.
A field preemption analysis asks whether Congress intended for the
FBSA to dominate the field of recreational boating safety, specifically
propeller guard use, to the exclusion of state involvement.tiO This
inquiry revolves around the FBSA's overall statutory scheme and
legislative history.2 Congress's intent to dominate recreational boat
and equipment safety regulations is evident.m The FBSA's right to
301. See supra notes 136-38 and accompanying text.

302. The Ard court's interpretation of the clause was especially unpersuasive. See
Ard v. Jensen, 996 S.W.2d 594, 596 (Mo. CL App. 1999). Ard greatly oversimplified
its preemption analysis by blithely stating that the savings clause should be read for its
ordinary meaning. See id. The court did so without support and without addressing
the other equally plausible interpretations. The result is a decision that seems nothing
more than a statement of opinion, which bears little resemblance to legal analysis.
303. Shields v. Outboard Marine Corp., 776 F. Supp. 1579,1582 (M.D. Ga. 1991).
304. See Grey, supra note 100, at 566; supra part II.B.2. But see supra notes 139,
269.
305. See supra note 143 for a general definition of field preemption.
306. Cf. Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 249 (1984) (discussing the
legislative history and statutory scheme of the Atomic Energy Act with respect to the
Act's preemption provision).
307. See S. Rep. No. 92-248, at 20 (1971), reprinted in 1971 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1333,
1341.
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preempt state law is grounded in the federal government's legacies of
federal preemption in maritime safety matters and of maintaining
uniformity within the stream of interstate commerce.3" The FBSA's
legislative history, however, stops short of establishing a case for field
preemption. Though Congress clearly desired that the Coast Guard set
uniform regulations, 3°9 it also encouraged state involvement in
developing regulation. 310 For example, the FBSA allows states to pass
additional regulations that vary from federal regulations where local
conditions warrant it.311 Under the FBSA, states may regulate safe boat
operation and use where it is "appropriately within the purview of state
or local concern."31
Although Shields found a case for field
preemption, it did so incorrectly because its cursory field preemption
analysis failed to properly acknowledge this element of state
involvement.3 3
Therefore, the overall evidence falls short of
establishing a clear case of field preemption.
The evidence more clearly supports a finding of conflict preemption.
The test under a conflict preemption analysis is whether compliance
with both standards-the one created by the Coast Guard's decision
not to require guards and the one created by allowing recovery on
these common law claims-is possible, or whether permitting relief for
these state law based claims would frustrate the FBSA's purpose or
regulatory scheme.31 4 There is no presumption against preemption in a
conflict preemption inquiry because the Supremacy Clause dictates that
federal law prevails over state law in a direct conflict, no matter what
the state interest.3 5
308. See id., reprintedin 1971 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1333,1341.
309. See id., reprintedin 1971 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1333, 1341.
310. See id. at 6, reprinted in 1971 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1333, 1341. ("The [FBSA] is also
intended to encourage greater state participation in boating safety efforts....").
311. See id. at 20. Florida is one locality that could have more success with this
argument, at least legislatively. Florida's waterways serve as home to many manatees,
an arguably endangered species. See Rob Chepak, Boat PropellerGuardsProposed to
Protect Manatees, The Tampa Tribune, Jan. 7, 1997, at 4. Propeller blades often cut
manatees, which are characteristically heavy-set and slow moving. See id. Proponents
of the legislation argue that guard requirements could reduce these casualties and
injuries. See Neil Santaniello, Bill Calls for Study of Propeller Guards, The SunSentinel, Apr. 21, 1997, at 6B. In 1996, 24 manatees died from propeller cuts. See id.
("Many of Florida's endangered manatees bear grotesque evidence of their
encounters with motorboats-gashes left across their backs by whirling propellers.");
see also Deborah Sharp, Next Collision of Manatees, Boats Might be in Court, USA
Today, June 11, 1999, at 17A (noting that "it's rare to spot any [manatees in Florida]
that do not bear scars left by boat propellers"). Manatee deaths caused by boat
collisions reached an all time high of 66 in 1998, compared to 21 in 1978. See id.
312. S. Rep. No. 92-248, at 20 (1971), reprinted in 1971 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1333, 1341.
313. See Shields v. Outboard Marine Corp., 776 F. Supp. 1579, 1581 (M.D. Ga.
1991).
314. See supra notes 148-52 and accompanying text.
315. See supra note 149 and accompanying text. Lewis and Davis correctly applied
this principle in their conflict preemption analyses. See Lewis v. Brunswick Corp., 107
F.3d 1494, 1502 (11th Cir.), cert. granted, 118 S.Ct. 439 (1997), cert. dismissed, 118 S.
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The first prong of the conflict preemption test does not preempt
these common law claims because compliance with both federal and
state standards is possible. Compliance with the federal standard is
automatic because the FBSA is silent as to the necessity of propeller
guard use? 16 Manufacturers may install or not install guards without
liability?17 Because the federal standard is silent, compliance under the
state standard is automatic as well, no matter what the standard. Thus,
even if jury awards for these claims are allowed, manufacturers may
still choose whether to install guards albeit at the risk of liability? 8
Because compliance with both standards is possible, no preemption
exists under this prong of conflict preemption.
The second prong of a conflict preemption analysis raises a
preemption concern because allowing recovery on these common law
claims could frustrate the FBSA's greater objectives. An analysis of
the FBSA's purposes and regulatory scheme, and the effect on the
aforementioned scheme of allowing state common law claims,3 19

reveals that the latter interferes with the execution of the former.
Thus, the FBSA preempts these common law claims under this prong
of conflict preemption'
The purpose of the FBSA, as set forth in its legislative history, is to
create uniform safety standards for manufacturers engaged in
recreational boating. 21 This emphasis on uniformity resonates
throughout the FBSA.m The FBSA's preemption clause requires that
state and federal law be identicalP2 In addition, the Coast Guard
affirmatively decided against requiring propeller guards?24 This could
be viewed as a decision to leave the area open for state regulation, or
as an unenforceable decision resulting in an absence of regulation of
propeller guards?25 Although it may be tempting to so interpret the
Ct. 1793 (1998); Davis v. Brunswick Corp., 854 F. Supp. 1574, 1581 (N.D. Ga. 1993),
on reconsideration in part (Mar. 17, 1994); supra text accompanying notes 204-05.
Shields, however, failed to acknowledge this principle, calling into question its conflict
preemption analysis.
316. The Coast Guard did not prohibit the use of propeller guards; it merely stated
that guards were not required. See supra part I.C.
317. See id.
31& See Moore v. Brunswick Bowling & Billiards Corp., 889 S.W.2d 246,251 (Tex.
1994).
319. See Klein, supra note 98, at 108.
320. See id
321. See supra part I.A.
322. See supra part I.A., I.B.
323. See supra part I.B.
324. See supra part I.C.
325. This is essentially what the plaintiffs in Lewis argued, relying on a Supreme
Court case where the plaintiff's state common law tort claims were preserved. See
Lewis v. Brunswick Corp., 107 F.3d 1494, 1502-03 (11th Cir.) (citing Freightliner
Corp. v. Myrick, 514 U.S. 280, 282 (1995)), cert. granted, 118 S. Ct. 439 (1997), cert.
dismissed, 118 S. Ct. 1793 (1998). In Freightliner,the Supreme Court failed to find the
plaintiff's claims expressly or implicitly preempted despite evidence of a federal intent
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and fails to bestow
Coast Guard's decision, it oversimplifies the issue
326
proper respect upon the Coast Guard's finding.
The Coast Guard's decision to refrain from mandating propeller
guards was thoroughly researched and affirmatively made. 27
Consequently, the Coast Guard's decision not to require guards
should be viewed as a form of federal regulation rather than a mere
absence of regulation.328 Adopting the Subcommittee's study, the
Coast Guard concluded that propeller guards should not be required
because propellers posed more of a risk with guards than without
them. 29 As the Coast Guard noted, mandating propeller guards could
increase rather than reduce overall accidents and injuries. 30 Equating
the Coast Guard's decision with an absence of regulation disregards
the Subcommittee's study and the Coast Guard's expertise in boating
safety. To allow juries of lay people to override these conclusions is
both illogical and misguided.

Additionally, the effect of a jury award can be tantamount to a
regulation requiring propeller guards. 3 31 Many courts have accepted
3 32
the regulatory effect of jury awards as equivalent to regulation.
Other courts, however, have held that jury awards do not amount to
regulation because manufacturers retain the choice whether to comply
under common law, even if it is at the risk of liability and high damage
to preempt state laws and regulation. See Freightliner,514 U.S. at 282. This argument
is misplaced, however, because the relevant statute in Freightlinerwas fundamentally
different from the FBSA, and because the relevant agency did not affirmatively
refrain from regulation, unlike the Coast Guard's decision regarding propeller guards.
See Lewis, 107 F.3d at 1502-04. First, the FBSA granted the Coast Guard the
exclusive authority to prescribe regulations for recreational boating safety, whereas
the Freightlinerstatute did not. See id. at 1504; supra part I.A. Second, the FBSA had
a much stronger emphasis on federal and state uniformity. See Lewis, 107 F.3d at
1504; supra part I.A. For example, the Freightlinerstatute's preemption provision
expressly allowed states to regulate until differing federal regulations were
established; the FBSA does not. See Freightliner,514 U.S. at 284. Third, the agency
with the exclusive authority to regulate affirmatively decided against regulation, while
in Freightliner,the courts, a third party, suspended the federal standard for further
review. See Lewis, 107 F.3d at 1504.
326. Cf. Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 250 (1984) (noting that an
agency can be "more qualified to determine what type of safety standards should be
enacted in [that] complex area [of nuclear regulation]").
327. See supra part I.C.
328. See supra part III.A.1.
329. See supra part I.C.
330. See supra part I.C.
331. See San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 246-47 (1959);
Carstensen v. Brunswick Corp., 49 F.3d 430, 432 (8th Cir. 1995); Moss v. Outboard
Marine Corp., 915 F. Supp. 183, 186 (E.D. Cal. 1996); Davis v. Brunswick Corp., 854
F. Supp. 1574, 1580 (N.D. Ga. 1993), on reconsideration in part (Mar. 17, 1994);
Shields v. Outboard Marine Corp., 776 F. Supp. 1579, 1581 (M.D. Ga. 1991); supra
part III.A.1.
332. See Carstensen, 49 F.3d at 432; Moss, 915 F. Supp. at 186 (citing Cipollone v.
Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504 (1992)); Davis, 854 F. Supp. at 1580 (citing Papas v.
Upjohn Co., 926 F.2d 1019 (11th Cir. 1991); Garmon, 359 U.S. at 236).
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awards 33 Because there is no statutory requirement, the offending
party is liable only if a successful claim is brought against it. This
view, however, inaccurately characterizes a situation where the risk of
liability is so great, especially as precedent for finding liability builds,
that manufacturers feel compelled to install guards. Thus, jury awards
are more properly recognized as a form of regulation, and as such,
effectively result in a mandate to install propeller guards,3 a result
clearly unauthorized under the FBSA.
Finally, the argument that the FBSA cannot preempt these claims
because Congress would never have intended to leave propeller strike
victims without redress is suspect?35 In these cases there are usually
two potential defendants-the motor manufacturer and the boat
operator. Propeller strike accidents are more often caused by
"[o]perator inexperience, incompetence, negligence, and alcoholic
[sic] intake," rather than a lack of a propeller guard per seY'6
Preempting claims against motor manufacturers will neither leave
plaintiffs without redress nor obstruct justice, because plaintiffs can
still seek relief against boat operators. Despite this fact, there has
been a surprising paucity of cases against boat operators, implying
that plaintiffs are suing to reach the "deep pockets" of the motor
manufacturers, rather than for redress or justice. The theory is even
more persuasive considering that requiring propeller guards could
bring even more dangers to recreational boating. Although propeller
related accidents are tragic for the victims and parties involved, the
proper remedy under current federal law lies not in civil suits against
motor manufacturers, but in focusing on what is often the
true culprit
tm
in these tragedies: boat operator ignorance or negligence
Furthermore, the Moore decision, which found no implied
preemption, was fatally flawed because it incorrectly applied the
implied conflict preemption analysis? 3s Despite recognizing a
"potential for conflict, [the Moore court did] not think it justifie[d] a
333. See Moore v. Brunswick Bowling & Billiards Corp., 889 S.W.2d 246,251 (Tex.
1994).
334. See Carstensen, 49 F.3d at 432; Moss, 915 F. Supp. at 186; Davis, 854 F. Supp.

at 1580.
335. See Moore, 889 S.W.2d at 251; see also Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464
U.S. 238,251 (1984) ("It is difficult to believe that Congress would, without comment,
remove all means of judicial recourse for those injured by illegal conduct."); Grey,
supra note 100, at 562 (recognizing that allowing "this preemption defense is of
critical importance to accident victims, because, if the defense is upheld, they may be

left without recourse to a damages remedy"). A similar argument was made in
Silkwood, where the plaintiff would not have had a remedy had her claims been
preempted. See Silkwood, 464 U.S. at 251. In Silk-wood, the only potential defendant
was the nuclear energy company, thus if the plaintiff were prevented from suing the
company, she would have been without redress. See id.
336. PropellerGuardReport,supra note 17, at 11.
337. See supra part I.C.

338 See Moore, 889 S.W.2d at 249-50.
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holding of preemption. '339 The Moore court incorrectly presumed
that the conflict had to justify preemption. The Supremacy Clause
dictates that federal law reigns supreme and overrides state law in a
conflict no matter what the state interest. 40 Courts have no such
choice in these conflicts. In essence, the Moore court erroneously
chose to override the doctrine of preemption, a choice that exceeded
its Constitutional power.
In sum, the majority's application of the preemption doctrine and
its interpretation of the FBSA incorrectly led to a finding of express
preemption. Despite the preemption clause, express preemption is
unfounded because the clause's scope is ambiguous. Rather, the
majority courts that found a case for implied preemption were
correct. 341 Congress's intent to preempt state common law claims for
failure to install propeller guards is evidenced both by its decision to
include a preemption clause in the FBSA and its legislative history
promoting uniformity in the laws governing recreational boating.
Allowing state common law claims for failure to install propeller
guards would subvert the FBSA's overall regulatory scheme.
Although the minority view raises some valid concerns regarding
states' rights, its erroneous application of implied preemption analysis
discredits its outcome.
CONCLUSION

The FBSA, together with the Coast Guard's decision not to
mandate propeller guards in recreational boats, implicitly preempts
state common law tort claims requiring propeller guards. A court
faced with a plaintiff suing a defendant-manufacturer for failure to use
a propeller guard should henceforth rule in favor of preempting the
plaintiff's claims pursuant to the doctrine of implied preemption.
Admittedly, this outcome may at times restrict a state's right to
regulate and protect its citizens, but this is an inevitable consequence
of our system of dual sovereignty. In recognition of this potential for
discord, the founding fathers included within the Constitution the
Supremacy Clause, which provides that federal law reign supreme
over state law when the two conflict. Thus, Congress's decision to
regulate recreational boating and the Coast Guard's refusal to
mandate propeller guards requires the federal preemption of
plaintiffs' state based tort claims. The principles of preemption and
federalism demand this result, however tragic for the victims of
recreational boating accidents and their families.
339. Id. at 251.
340. See supra notes 96-99 and accompanying text.

341. See Lewis v. Brunswick Corp., 107 F.3d 1494, 1502-03 (11th Cir.), cert. granted,
118 S. Ct. 439 (1997), cert. dismissed, 118 S. Ct. 1793 (1998); Davis v. Brunswick Corp.,
854 F. Supp. 1574, 1582 (N.D. Ga. 1993), on reconsiderationin part (Mar. 17, 1994).

